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ABSTRACT 
In Hong Kong, where population is dense and land space is precious, housing 
issue is always one of the prime concerns of the public. Although the government 
has been offering various public rental housing and subsidized housing schemes 
to the society, majority of the households still incline to purchase first-hand 
residential properties from the private developers when they are able to afford. 
Yet, for many years, the protection to the property purchasers is always criticized 
as inadequate. In the 1980s, unfair sales arrangement and misleading sales 
information were commonly found in the sale of first-hand residential properties. 
The malpractices of the developers were so rampant that the government decided 
to adopt a multi-pronged approach with four major policy tools, namely the 
Consent Scheme, guideline issued by REDA, regulatory frameworks by the EAA 
and the Consumer Council, to tackle the problems. Nonetheless, the problems 
continued despite repeated effort made to optimize the tools. Finally, the 
government introduced a big bang policy change with a centralized legislation to 
govern the issue in 2012.  
In this project, John Kingdon's three-stream model (1995) is used as the skeleton 
to analyze the policy and administrative dynamics regarding the regulatory 
framework on the sale of primary residential properties. It first examines the 
situation prior to the introduction of the Residential Properties (First-hand Sales) 
Ordinance when the four major tools are in use. It recognizes and categorizes the 
re-emergence of the problem stream with the Freiberg's classifications (2010). 
The ineffectiveness of the tools and repeated failure to reform them leading to the 
government decision to formulate a new legislation is analyzed through the five 
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assessment criteria identified by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) and two factors 
by Freiberg, and a policy-making cycle model developed in this project. Together 
with the political stream influenced by public mood and administration change, a 
big bang system changing, as classified according to the Elmore's theory (1987), 
takes place.  
The situation after the implementation of the Ordinance is also contemplated 
through the Kingdon’s three-stream model. The project discovered the business 
freedoms offered in the Ordinance are abused by the developers and the dynamic 
in problem stream is triggered. Applying the aforementioned policy making cycle 
model with various theories, it is found that the policy consideration process and 
the effectiveness of the Ordinance are correlated in creating the situation requiring 
the government to choose policy arrangement. Noting the public mood to change 
is not strong under political stream, it concludes the policy dynamic in the post 
Ordinance period is not to substitute the tool, but to optimize the existing 
regulatory framework under the Ordinance. Taking reference from the experience 
in Taiwan and Singapore, the project further suggests a number of measures based 
on the criteria by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge to enhance the effectiveness of the 
Ordinance.  
The integrated policy dynamic analytical framework proposed in this project is 
considered conducive to formulating, reviewing and optimizing the policies. To 
provide appropriate, effective and timely policies to the community, the 
government is suggested to utilize the framework in different policy areas in 
future.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Focus, Objective and background of the Project 
At the southeastern tip of China, Hong Kong has a total area of 1104 square 
kilometers with over seven million populations (Hong Kong Fact Sheets, 2014). 
Space in this metropolitan city is limited and condensed with. Residential housing 
demand has been high since 1970s, when population continuously rushed into 
Hong Kong. Property price kept going up the slope. The growth in property 
values continues despite the fact that Hong Kong government implements various 
cooling measures. 
To deal with the rising property price and housing demand, the government also 
increased property supply by offering public rental housing and various 
subsidized housing schemes to the society. However, majority of the households 
still incline to purchase primary residential properties from the private developers 
when they are able to afford. However, real estate developers in Hong Kong have 
been for long criticized to be keen and monopolized the household development. 
The sale procedure is not transparent and rifted with malpractices, and buyers can 
only access to limited information on first-hand residential properties, in particular 
those uncompleted properties. To balance the benefit of general public, the Hong 
Kong government adopts various policy tools to monitor the situation.  
This project addresses the regulations and policy tools in Hong Kong real estate 
industry, in particular those adopted in the sale of first-hand residential properties. 
The objectives are to understand the policy making and administrative processes 
2 
in the regulatory framework on the sale of first-hand residential properties in 
Hong Kong, and the dynamics under problem, policy and political streams driving 
the government to change or optimize its policy tools under different 
circumstances. 
Research Questions and Propositions: Theory and Practice 
To study Hong Kong’s regulatory frameworks in the sale of first-hand residential 
properties, this study will examine different tools used by the government, 
evaluate their effectiveness and suggest how the government can enhance 
effectiveness of policies. The study will base on the following research questions:  
1. Why, and how, might governments seek to regulate the sale of residential 
properties in their communities? 
2. How has the Hong Kong government traditionally responded to the issue 
of first-hand residential property sales? 
3. What prompted the Hong Kong government to change its response to the 
issue of first-hand residential property sales? 
4. How has the Hong Kong government chosen the policy tools in 
monitoring the sale of first-hand residential properties in Hong Kong? 
5. How effective has the government’s response been in terms of relevant 
evaluative criteria? 
6. How might the government adjust its policy tools to strengthen the 
effectiveness? 
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Over the years, the Hong Kong government has adopted multi-pronged 
approaches to monitor the first-hand residential property market.  The sale of 
residential property is a complicated and technical process which involves a 
number of stakeholders, and therefore public policies implemented in the past in 
regulating the issue were integrated with different types of governance and policy 
tools, and they will be examined in this project to answer the above research 
questions.   
In 2012, the Hong Kong government enacted the Residential Properties (First-
hand Sales) Ordinance, which legislatively regulates the market. The project will 
also evaluate the effectiveness of the Ordinance and see whether it fulfills public 
expectation. Residential regulation is of no unique issue, similar measures are also 
found in other cities. The policies used in cities like Singapore and Taiwan will 
also be studied, with a view to finding ways to strengthen the relevant policy’s 
effectiveness in Hong Kong. 
Overview of Analytical Framework 
Policy making is a complicated process. It is affected by many factors such as 
socio-economic condition, political circumstances and government resources. To 
study the policy making process of the regulatory framework on the sale of first-
hand residential properties, this project adopts various theories concerning policy 
making and administrative dynamic.  
Kingdon’s three-stream theory will be used as the skeleton to study the policy. 
The theory looks into situation in three streams, namely problem stream, policy 
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stream and political stream. The three streams study on why governments 
intervene, how governments may intervene, and the political dynamics. In each 
stream, the project has incorporated a number of theories to study respective 
stream in depth.  
To critically look into the issue, Knill & Tosun’s type of governance is used in 
this study. Knill & Tosun summarize the type of governance into four types, 
namely interventionist governance, regulated self-governance, cooperative 
governance and private self-governance. The four types of governance are 
categorized according to the level of governance and private sector cooperation 
and the degree of legal obligation.  
The emergence of social problem can be caused by many factors, the project will 
adopt Freiberg’s fostering factor to analyse the outbreak of the problem in a more 
detailed way. The categorization of market failure, public interest, risk 
management and trust, will give us a clearer understanding in the problem stream. 
To handle the social problem, government needs to choose policy tools and 
formulate policies to tackle the situation. Elmore’s policy tool classification of 
mandates, inducements, capacity building and system changing, which could be 
linked with policy stream, will be used. 
To understand whether the regulations and policies used by the government is 
legitimate or worthy of support, the assessment criteria developed by Baldwin, 
Cave and Lodge as well as Freiberg was used.  The criteria consisted of five 
assessment criteria and two important factors, including (i) Legitimacy; (ii) 
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Effectiveness; (iii) Accountability; (iv) Due Process; (v) Expertise; (vi) Efficiency; 
and (vii) Autonomy. 
Research Methodology 
To study the social issue on the sale of first-hand residential properties, this 
project focuses on the latest market development. Apart from the overview of 
Hong Kong Housing History, where research was made on publications, majority 
of the project research was based on local and international news reports, 
Legislative Council (LegCo) discussion papers, consultation documents, journals, 
guidelines and regulations from institutions. In order to have a holistic overview 
on the effectiveness of the Ordinance, review report from Consumer Council, 
comments from LegCo members, views and comments drawn from concerned 
stakeholders were also included in this project.  
Extensive desktop research was conducted on the Internet, which have provided 
the most up-to-date information and data on this social issue. Institutes websites 
were kept updated and offered comprehensive details. Overseas experience of 
Taiwan and Singapore were also researched through the Internet.  
Chapters Outline 
This project consisted of six chapters. The current chapter, Chapter 1, provides the 
objective and background on the project; the research questions and propositions; 
analytical framework used throughout the project; and the research methodology.  
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Chapter 2 is the literature review of the analytical framework used, including 
Kingdon’s three-stream theory, Knill & Tosun’s type of governance, Freiberg’s 
regulation fostering factors, Elmore’s policy tools classification, and Baldwin, 
Cave & Lodge’s regulation assessment tool. 
Chapter 3 reviewed Hong Kong Housing History, the type of governance and 
policy tools applied over the years. It also overviewed government policies and 
related developments concerning first-hand residential properties. 
Chapter 4 detailed the dynamics in why the government needs to alter its existing 
tools to the sale of first-hand residential properties and how the government 
decides and chooses the policy tools, and analyzed the issue using the framework 
illustrated in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 discussed the policy and administrative dynamics of the Ordinance with 
reference to the Kingdon’s three-stream model, and critically studied the 
Ordinance’s effectiveness. 
Chapter 6 provided suggested Ordinance improvement measures with reference to 
overseas experience, where similar regulations on sales of first-hand residential 
properties also enact.  
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CHAPTER 2 - ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Under the nowadays-evolving complex and diverse environment, public managers 
always face many challenging social problems covering different aspects. There is 
a wide range of policy tools and choices of combination that governments can 
choose to respond to the challenges within the bounds of various types of 
governance. The choice between different types of governance and policy tools is 
not a free choice, but affected by the political problems that have to be addressed, 
the existing institutional structures, political context, and resources and power of 
different actors (Knill and Tosun 2012, p.212).  
Of particular significance to types of governance and policy tools, Kingdon’s 
(1995) three-stream theory provides a useful way to look at the issues through the 
problem, policy and political streams within which it is possible to analyze the 
justifications for why governments intervene, how governments may intervene, 
and the political dynamics in reaching consensus on what is appropriate and 
legitimate. The question of why the government intervenes mainly falls on the 
expectation of the general public. When the social and informal mechanisms are 
proven to be inadequate to protect the public, people look into the government to 
act on their behalf to produce some regulatory outcomes (Freiberg, 2010). Public 
policies are packages of policy tools. Governments could adopt a hybrid of 
authoritative rules, resources re-allocation, investment and change of system. 
Elmore’s policy tool paradigm explores the nature of a policy proposal and 
explains the choice of policy tools (Elmore, 1987). Next, the policy to be 
implemented needs to be tested to ensure it is legitimate or worthy of support 
under the political aspect. Various criteria, including legislative mandate, 
accountability, due process, expertise and efficiency, are appropriately considered 
as a tool for assessing the adoption of regulatory and other tools (Baldwin, Cave 
and Lodge, 2012 p.39).  
The interlocking relationships of the above form the analytical framework of the 
study on regulating the sale of first-hand residential properties in Hong Kong. The 
main elements of the framework are set out in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1  Main elements of the analytical framework 
Analytical Framework
Political problems 
have to be 
addressed
Existing 
institutional 
structures
Political context
Resources and power 
of different actors
Problem Stream Political StreamPolicy StreamKingdon
Knill & 
Tosun
Freiberg
1. Public Interest
2. Market Failure
3. Risk Management
4. Trust
Why? What are the 
natures of the 
problems?
How the policy 
should be? 
When?
Legitimacy?
Elmore
1. Mandates
2. Inducements
3. Capacity building
4. System-changing
Baldwin, 
Cave & 
Lodge
a) Effectiveness of the existing mechanisms?
b) Measures to improve the existing mechanisms?
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Types of Governance 
As mentioned above, the level of government intervention determines the type of 
governance, which includes interventionist governance, regulated self-governance, 
cooperative governance and private self-governance (Knill & Tosun, 2012). The 
characteristics of these four broad types of governance are illustrated below. 
The type of governance focuses on the patterns of political steering, which is the 
institutionalized relationship between public and private players in resolving 
social problems. As illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, Knill and Lenschow (2003), 
classified the type of governance into four ideal types, depending on the 
configuration of two dimensions, the level of hierarchical modes which is 
assessed through the degree of legal obligation that characterizes collective policy 
solutions and the degree of cooperation of public and private actors in the policy 
making process (Knill and Tosun 2012, p.209). 
Figure 2.2 Types of Governance 
Cooperation of public and private actors 
 
High Low 
High Regulated self governance Interventionist governance 
Degree of legal obligation 
Low Cooperative governance Private self governance 
Source: Knill & Tosun (2012) quoting Knill & Lenscho (2003) 
Interventionist Governance 
Interventionist governance reflects the classical style of policy-making that 
hierarchical intervention of the state is required for provision of public goods and 
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services. It does not necessarily means there is exclusion of involvement of 
private actors, but the main responsibility vests on the government. This type of 
governance is characterized by a hierarchical relationship between public and 
private actors, with heavy involvement of the government adopting a top-down 
approach of command and control through highly detailed and legally binding 
requirements, that is, it clearly defined rules and regulations requiring both the 
public and private actors to comply (Knill and Tosun, 2012).  
Regulated self-governance 
For regulated self-governance, the hierarchical relationship between the public 
and the private actors still strongly exists. The private actors have to comply with 
the detailed defined rules and regulations. However, active cooperation between 
the public and the private actors is found in the formulation and implementation of 
public policy while the government retains its authoritative decision making role. 
This type of governance could be arranged in different ways, including inviting 
private actors to participate in policy making and implementation, delegating 
competencies to private organizations, or developing regulatory frameworks for 
private self-governance cooperatively (Knill and Tosun, 2012). 
Cooperative governance  
Different from the previous two types of governance, the cooperative governance 
and private self-governance dominate the role in policy formulation and 
implementation played by the private actors rather than the government. In 
cooperative governance, instead of relying on legally binding requirements, the 
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definition and application of instruments are compromised through negotiations 
and voluntary agreements between public and private actors. There is no 
authoritative top-down decision making process. For the rules of cooperative 
governance, it is developed by bargaining on equality between public and private 
actors.  
Private self-governance 
Compared to the cooperative governance, there is no involvement of public actors 
in the definition and implementation of public policies in private self-governance 
(Knill and Tosun, 2012). The private actors are in the sole control in decision-
making process and on voluntary basis. The government only provides 
complementary contribution, such as guidance during the processes. 
Types of governance and the significance of the three streams in agenda 
setting 
The types of governance illustrated above is interrelated to the problems have to 
be solved. Usually, an incident happens and it catches public or politicians’ 
attention. It is then brought into agenda-setting process, i.e. to put in the 
legislative body for discussion on the way forward and the policy tools to be 
adopted. The decision making process depends on the bargaining power among 
the politicians and the stakeholders involved by consideration of a wide range of 
factors, including political and social aspects, and resources required. Of 
particular significance to types of governance and policy tools, Kingdon’s (1995) 
three-stream theory provides a useful way to look at the issues through the 
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problem, policy and political streams within which it is possible to analyze the 
justifications for why governments intervene, how governments may intervene, 
and the political dynamics in reaching consensus on what is appropriate and 
legitimate. 
To help understand the processes of agenda setting in the government towards a 
particular political and social problem, Kingdon’s (1995) three-stream model is 
adopted in the project. The value of the Kingdon approach is that the problem 
stream asks why intervene or not intervene, the policy steam asks how the 
government may intervene and the political steam touches on the issue of reaching 
consensus on what policy tools to be chosen. To be specific, the problem stream 
explains the reason for regulation, the policy stream explains the process of 
choosing the policy tools and the political stream examines the political condition 
and the legitimacy of the policy. The flow of the three streams represents what 
creates the momentum necessary to place an issue on the public policy agenda, 
then to move it from the “government agenda” box to the “decision agenda” box, 
and finally to lead the government to change public policy. The three streams flow 
independently but once they couple, a policy window occurs which facilitates 
policy change. 
The problem stream: why regulate? 
The problem stream emerges when members of the public are persuaded that 
some actions have to be taken to improve the current situation. It may be brought 
up due to indicators, polling result, feedback about current programs or focusing 
events nurturing pre-existing problem that are “in the back of people’s minds”. In 
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addition, budgets could be a triggering event that prompt an item up to the policy 
agenda or restrain an item from gaining a higher position on the agenda (Kingdon, 
1995). On the other hand, a problem can be intentionally identified to affect 
members’ attention towards the problem (Rochefort and Cobb’s, 1994). 
Similar to Kindon’s theory, Freiberg thinks that social and informal mechanisms 
are basic modes of regulating private behavior, however, people look to 
governments to act on their behalf to produce some regulatory outcomes, when 
these prove to be inadequate to protect people from serious harm, when markets 
fail to deliver the level or quality of goods and services desired by the community, 
or when the public confidence is threatened (Freiberg, 2010). Freiberg divides the 
fostering factors the regulation by the government into four categories, namely, 
market failure, public interest, risk management and trust.  
The government needs to be proactive in regulating problems when public interest 
is harmed. In legal sense, it could be something beyond private interest that the 
government needs to protect, no matter how small the size the affected group is. If 
viewed from economical angle, it could meant a collective good to maximize the 
social welfare, e.g. for transparency or for human right. 
Market failure can be caused by inefficient market, when there are too few 
suppliers, i.e. in monopoly market like utility industry. The government is then 
needed to step in to regulate the conduct of market participants by employing 
different tools, like prices setting and punishment of collusion. Another cause of 
market failure is externalities, which is the cost or benefit that imposes on others 
who do not choose to incur such cost or benefit in the market pricing mechanism. 
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In addition, information asymmetry can fail the market. During a transaction, one 
side may be in favor if it holds important bearing information on the price or 
condition but the other side does not have. 
The third aspect is on balancing of risk. Risk management is widely accepted as 
an important measure to be taken by the government worldwide. It is the 
government’s responsibility to assess and manage risk so that the least loss is 
resulted from any possible risk. The risk assessment normally covers the area of 
social, economical, technical, health and environmental. Risk related regulation, 
e.g. regulation on work health, safety and environmental protection is regarded as 
a form of risk management. 
The last aspect is on trust. It is of primary concern of a government to create 
social order and engender trust and confidence in the system. In the regulatory 
context, regulation lowers the transaction costs. The provision of formal way of 
trust saves each transaction to be verified. Have said, the formal and informal 
systems of trust complemented the fragile construction of economic and social 
orders. In other words, regulation is formulated to produce an environment in 
which people can act in confidence about the conduct of others. 
Policy stream: choice of policy tools 
The policy stream is about how the government intervenes or on what policy 
tool(s) to be employed in solving the problems. It relates the policy making 
process in which proposals are prepared, redrafted and endorsed in the policy 
system. The feasibility of a proposal relies on its technical viability, costs, 
15 
supports from the public and politicians, as well as the indigenous value choices 
in the community (Kingdon, 1995; Cairney, 2012). The policy stream creates a 
short list of solutions, which is an agreement that some particular proposals are 
prominent (Kingdon, 1995). 
There are many literatures on policy tools. Elmore provides one useful 
classification. It is not only because of the four sensible components defined by 
Elmore, but many other authors on policy tools and instruments have similar 
classifications. Elmore (1987) defines policy tool paradigm as the exploration of 
the nature of a policy proposal and explanation of the choice of policy tools. Each 
policy tool has its unique nature, characteristics, requirements, strengths and 
weaknesses.  Elmore classifies policy tools into four categories, namely mandates, 
inducements, capacity building and system changing accordingly. 
Mandates are the authoritative rules or prescriptions governing the behavior of 
individuals and agencies, and are intended to produce compliance (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1991).   It is based on the assumption that “the actions required is 
something all individuals or agencies should do, regardless of their differing 
capacities, and that the action would not occur, or would occur with less than the 
desired frequency, in the absence of explicit prescription.” Inducements are 
“conditional transfer of money in return for the productions certain goods and 
services”. It is based on the assumption that “in the absence of additional 
resources, one would not expect certain valued outcomes to be produced, or to be 
produced with the desired frequency of consistency required by policy, and that 
money is an effective way to elicit performance.” Capacity building is various 
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kinds of investment to enhance capabilities. As defined by Elmore (1987), it is 
“the conditional transfer of money to individuals or agencies for the purpose of 
investment in future material, intellectual, and human resources.”   It carries with 
it “the expectation of future returns.  But these are often uncertain, intangible, and 
immeasurable”.  It is noted that capacity building is different from mandates and 
inducements on its proximity and tangibility of their effects.  The former is for 
long term effect and is rather distant and ambiguous for capacity building but the 
latter two are more proximate and tangible.  System changing is “the transfer of 
official authority among individuals and agencies to alter the system by which public 
goods and services are delivered”.   
There are some other similar literatures on policy tools. Hood (2009)’s 
classification on social recourses namely nodality, authority, treasure and 
organization. Vedung (1998)’s carrots, sticks and sermons theory and Freiberg 
(2010)’s classification of different forms of regulation. Though they are under 
different classification method and by different scholars, they are actually 
referring to the similar underlying principles. 
According to Hood’s NATO theory, nodality is the ‘property of being in the 
middle of an information or social network’ (Hood, 2009). It is somehow similar 
to capacity building concept under Elmore’s theory about investment of various 
kinds, including information building. Authority refers to the ‘possession of legal 
or official power . . . to demand, forbid, guarantee, adjudicate’ which shares 
similar interpretation of Elmore’s Mandates. By definition, governments are 
granted the power or the right to give orders or make decisions concerning others. 
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Authority is used through tokens such as certificates, laws, and sanctions. 
Treasure indicates ‘the possession of a stock of moneys or fungible chattels’. 
Governments can spend their financial resources to attain policy goals. Treasure is 
spent in salary, rewards, materials and other equipment. This is similar to 
Inducement under Elmore’s theory. Organization denotes ‘the possession of a 
stock of people . . . land, buildings, materials and equipment somehow arranged’. 
Governments can utilize the structure or machinery of the state as an instrument. 
Organization as a resource is employed in what Hood calls ‘treatments’, namely 
the use of people’s efforts and other material capabilities of the organization. This 
is comparable to Elmore’s theory of capacity building and system changing.  
Vedung’s concept of “carrot” resembles Elmore’s classification of inducement.  
Carrot is about the use of economic policy instruments to give or take away 
economic resources by altering the monetary, time or other costs associated with 
the action. With reference to Vedung, “Economic tools always leave the subjects 
of governance a certain leeway within which to choose by themselves whether to 
take an action or not” (Vedung, 1998, p.32). Vedung’s classification of “sticks” is 
self-descriptive. It refers to the regulations taken by the government to influence 
people by means of formulate rules and directives (Vedung 1998, p. 31). To 
achieve this purpose, it is always backed by negative sanctions and all kinds of 
punishment. The third kind of policy tools is named as “sermon” which is kind of 
information instruments.  Capacity building could be in another form as transfer 
of knowledge. Its ultimate goal is to guide the people towards the right conduct 
and avoid of the wrong by influencing them through transfer to intelligence. This 
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kind of information instrument could be in any forms, like books, public 
campaign or training programme.   
According to Freiberg (2010), regulation is about the use of power.  Freiberg 
classified the power that the government can employ in six board forms.  The 
authorization as regulation is the strictest one which legitimate a particular activity, 
status or premises. Legal regulation is about the ability to invoke the mechanism 
of the legal system of applying or not applying other resources through 
legitimated authority. Nevertheless, regulation could also be empowered in 
economic way by means of manipulation of production, allocation or use of 
material resources such as money or property. One form of these regulations is 
economic regulation which is to stimulate incentive with public policy goals or 
deter the market by extraction of resources. Transactional regulation is a similar 
kind with the explicit use of contract or grant to alter the allocation of economic 
resources.  Both the economic and transactional regulation could be a kind of 
reward of punishment and comparable to Elmore’s classification of inducement 
and mandates. Structural regulation concerns the setting of the system while 
informational regulation is about the change on capability, advice and attitude. 
These two regulations are clearly analogous to Elmore’s classification of system 
changing and capacity building.  
To achieve the desired policy result, due considerations should be given to the 
choice of policy tools, especially about the directness and the time constraints on 
implementation of the policy. It is no doubt that mandates and inducement could 
bring direct impact to the society. However, the outcome could not be easily 
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predicted due to the time required for nurturing the new institutions. On the other 
hand, capacity building may pave way for the success of future policies but there 
is a problem on how to reconcile short-term results of investments with longer-
term expectations. Similarly, for changing of the present institutional 
arrangements, the policymakers have to consider the probability that the recipients 
of new authority use it in ways that are inconsistent with the expected outcomes 
(Elmore 1987). 
Political stream: legitimacy and support 
Kingdon (1995) pointed out that consensus building is influenced by bargaining. 
Both elected politicians and non-elected Governmental officials would assess the 
public mood normally perceived from certain active sectors of the public. Apart 
from the public mood, government officials would also consider the extent of 
consensus among organized political. Further, any turnover or change of 
administration would also affect the prominence of an issue on the policy agenda. 
In this respect, participants would take part in the bargaining process to protect 
their interests or gain some benefits. 
To evaluate whether a regulatory regime is legitimate or worthy of support, some 
benchmarks are relevant. Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) suggest using five 
criteria namely, legislative mandate, accountability, due process, expertise and 
efficiency as a tool for assessing the regulation (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012 
p.39).  
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The regulatory action gains support when it is authorized by Parliament or elected 
legislature. The regulators have fulfilled their mandate when they have acted in 
the way the people have instructed them to achieve. The regulators are often 
empowered with large discretion who may interpret the mandate in vary senses. In 
addition, the stated objectives of the regulation may invincibly cause tension and 
conflict. Regulators should be held accountable and properly controlled by 
democratic institutions so as to seek support from the public. The regulatory 
agency might claim that it is accountable for its interpretation of its mandate to a 
representative body and that this oversight renders its exercise of powers 
acceptable.  
Procedures should also be sufficiently fair, accessible, and open which allow the 
public and particularly, the affected parties, to participate in the regulatory 
decisions and policy processes. It is the due process requirement. Very often, 
specific rules and regulations require the exercise of expert judgement. Regulators 
have to consider a number of factors and variables, of which specialized 
knowledge skills and experience are required. The regulators may claim support if 
they are expert in that area. Last but not least, the legislative mandate should be 
implemented efficiently. It may be measured by the level of inputs or costs 
compared to the outputs achieved, or in other words, productive efficiency. An 
alternative measurement is on the results produced, which are assessed by criteria 
set down with a degree of independence from the mandate.  
Freiberg has pointed out two important factors, effectiveness and flexibility, in 
evaluating regulations. It is easy to understand that effectiveness is the 
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measurement of whether the desired outcomes have been achieved by regulations. 
It addressed the issue of whether the desired regulatory objective has been 
achieved (Freiberg, 2010 p.260). It concerns the extent to which regulation 
achieves its intended objectives (at a socially acceptable cost). This not only 
encompasses the extent to which regulation has substantive or symbolic objectives, 
but also the extent to which it facilitates compliance and enforceability, and has 
minimal adverse or unintended consequences (Robert 1994). Flexibility means 
that the regulation should be regularly reviewed and kept up-to-date so as to 
response timely to any changes or potential risks with appropriate adjustments. 
Flexibility sometimes is interpreted as autonomy in some professions or sports 
sectors of which they have control over its own membership and their behavior 
(Baldwin 2012 p.137). They have usually established institutional arrangements 
with the government that they are free from intervention by external bodies.  
Concluding Remarks  
The type of governance is confined by the commitment or level of intervention of 
the government, which gives the blueprint of the policy. However, at the same 
time, the political problems, the institutional structures, the political context, and 
resources and power of different actors affects the development of the model of 
governance. Within such broad context, Kingdon’s three-stream model gives an 
insight to analyze the problem through the problem, policy and political streams. 
The lens helped to study why problem catches attention of the public or 
politicians, the consideration on the package of policy tools to be employed and 
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the consensus reaching between the politicians and the legitimacy issue of the 
policy. 
In this connection, Kingdon’s three-stream model is used as the skeleton, together 
with other corresponding theories, to analyze the policy making and 
administrative processes in the regulatory framework on the sale of first-hand 
residential properties in Hong Kong. After that, examination on the model of 
governance in the regulatory framework on the sale of first-hand residential 
properties in Hong Kong at different stages will be conducted. The project will 
analyze whether the problem is caused by market failure, public interest, risk 
management and trust or a mix of them, the choice of policy tools, whether 
mandates, inducements, capacity building and system changing have been 
matched with the problem and the legitimacy of the policy. Applying Freiburg 
and Baldwin’s literature, the project will assess the policy tools being employed 
and suggest comments on the possible improvements.  
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CHAPTER 3 - OVERVIEW OF HONG KONG HOUSING HISTORY 
Introduction 
Residence is important to every individual. It is more than just a place for shelter, 
but also what called home. Chinese are especially concerned on the place of living. 
They will spend most of their lifetime to work hard to earn money for a place to 
live. In Hong Kong, where the population density is high and land space is limited, 
residential properties became precious. Over the years, the colonial government 
and the SAR Government introduced various policies to equilibrate between the 
demand and supply in order to make here a better for living to the Hong Kong 
people. 
The Hong Kong Government has adapted the positive non-interventionism 
towards housing policies. In the pre-war era, the government maintained Laissez-
faire. Until 1960s, the government gradually promulgated resettlement housings 
after the Shek Kip Mei fire. Then with the huge inflow of population from the 
Mainland China, household became crowded and the government introduced a 
new of policies. Starting from the 1970s, the British government paid more 
concern on Hong Kong’s housing development. As population gradually 
increased, housing became a major concern for the citizens. As a developing city, 
the government adapted the cooperative governance approach towards housing. It 
promulgated the ten-year housing policy and long-term housing strategies to 
benchmark the development direction. The government utilized the manpower 
and technique provided by private estate developers, and at the same time 
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provided public housing to map a development progress of Hong Kong’s overall 
housing policies. 
The Emerge of the Problem Stream: 1953 Shek Kip Mei Fire 
The situation 
The population of Hong Kong grew drastically after the World War II, Hong 
Kong Economy began to raise results in the huge influx of immigrants from the 
Mainland China. At that time, one of every three Hong Kong residents was 
refugee escape from China. They were difficult to find a place for living due to 
lack of money. To look for a roof over their heads, more than 50,000 refuges built 
their homes on the rocky hillside of Shek Kip Mei. The living conditions in these 
squatter areas were unpleasant with little privacy. In some cases, 5 to 6 family 
members were required to squeeze into a small bathroom-sized cubical.  
Inside the squatter area, there was no sanitation. Sewage was left in the alley 
under the sun. Drinking water had to be collected from the hillside. Households 
were packed without any anti-fire facilities.  
On the Christmas night of 1953, a huge fire ravaged the Shek Kip Mei squatter 
wooden huts. Because the huts were packed and disorderly built, the fire soon 
spread to the whole hillside and destroyed the homes of some 58,000 people.  
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Governance and policy tools 
In the early days of Hong Kong, the government put emphasis on the economic 
development and maintained low level of control towards other public policies. In 
this private self-governance of housing policy, the public was not safeguarded by 
any policies because the government did not regulate the building and 
development of housing property.  
Not until the outbreak of Shek Kip Mei fire, the public paid serious concern on the 
issue and sought immediate actions from the government. According to Freiberg, 
people look to governments to act on their behalf to produce some regulatory 
outcomes, when these prove to be inadequate to protect people from serious harm 
(Freiberg, 2010). The Shek Kip Mei fire aroused public interest, one of the 
fostering factors in regulating the government as categorized by Freiberg, it 
identified the risk of living condition might have further deteriorated if policies 
were not introduced. The government had no choice but to put the issue on top of 
the agenda list. 
To immediately relieve the situation, the government soon embarked on the 
construction of resettlement blocks with reinforced concrete. By end of 1954, the 
first batch of eight six-storey blocks was built. In the following eight years, 21 
more seven-storey blocks were built.  
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Policy Stream (I): 1972 Sir Murray MacLehose Ten-year Housing Policy 
The situation 
After the Shek Kip Mei fire, people became more and more concern on the living 
condition. At that time, housing policies were actually satisfying the needs for 
private commercials, industrials and residential developments instead of the need 
of the poor. The government became more aware on the need and determined in 
helping people to build a safer home.  
In 1972, the Governor Sir Murray MacLehose announced the Ten-year Housing 
Policy. The government believed that providing low-cost housing for needy 
citizens would not only maintain social stability, but also  t increase employment 
opportunities and stimulate consumption, thereby bringing further economic 
growth (Leung 1999, p.143). The Governor also erected the new Housing 
Ordinance and established the Housing Department (the former Housing 
Authority) to formulate and execute various housing policies toward private and 
public housings.  
Governance and policy tools 
Following the Ten-year Housing Policy, the government promulgated the Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS) in order to assist the lower and middle class families. 
Instead of renting small flats from the government, the HOS helped residents in 
buying flats of their own. Through the scheme, the government on one hand can 
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develop new towns and on the other hand residents can have more spacious flats 
through the relocation of population.  
Apart from the flats built by the Housing Department under the HOS, the 
government also invited private sector to participate in the building of HOS flats 
under the Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS). The government can then 
accelerate the building speed and integrate talents from the private sector. 
Throughout the Ten-year Housing Policy, the government has seldom cooperated 
with the private sector, since the government set up its own Housing Department, 
which provided a continuous line services in housing supplies. Though private 
sector was invited to participate in HOS, the authority given to private sector was 
minimal. According to Knill & Tosun, Hong Kong at that time was undergoing 
the cooperative governance model. 
The implementation of PSPS involved private sector by employing outsource 
estate developer or contactors to participate in household buildings. According to 
Elmore’s policy tools, it is an inducement policy. The government utilized the 
talents in existed in the private sector to accelerate the speed in construction. The 
government still withheld the policy decision.  
Policy Stream (II): 1987 Long Term Housing Strategy 
The situation 
The Ten-year housing policy announced in 1972 was highly appreciated by the 
public, the policy was therefore extended for another 5 years to 1978. The 
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government noticed the public look forwarded to long term housing policy, which 
can reassure Hong Kong’s stability and enhance the confidence of residence.  
The government conducted a review on its housing policy and took into account 
the following objectives: 
(a) to ensure that adequate housing at an affordable price or 
rent is available to all households; 
(b) to promote and satisfy the growing demand for home 
purchase; 
(c) to ensure that the need for all types of housing is satisfied 
with minimum delay and in accordance with established 
priorities; 
(d) to improve residential living conditions by redeveloping 
older public housing estates whose standards are below 
present expectations and by encouraging redevelopment of 
older private housing; 
(e) to secure the most effective use of the resources of both 
the public and private sector in housing production; and 
(f) to ensure that public resources spent on housing are used 
most efficiently by ensuring that a household's benefit from 
housing subsidy is in relation to its need.  
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The Strategy was designed in detail and projected a number of benchmarks, which 
guided Hong Kong housing strategy up till 2001. Since the establishment of 
Housing Department, the government used its major expenses on the construction 
of public housing. In the Long Term Housing Strategy announced in 1987, the 
government introduced a new form of assistance to low- and middle-income 
families - the Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS). 
The HPLS assisted these families who wishing to purchase new private flats, the 
housing subsidy policy induced better-off tenants to purchase instead of 
continuing to rent homes, thereby releasing their rental flats for the more needy. 
Governance and policy tools 
The Strategy realistically reflected the public’s demand with the huge upsurge of 
population. And most importantly, the government engaged both public and 
private housing units to take part in meeting the housing goal. The involvement of 
private sector successfully satisfied the housing demand and the housing policy 
regulation shifted from government driven to market driven. There was active 
cooperation between the private and the public sector. The HPLS in a sense 
controlled the amount housing flats influx to the market. The regulated self-
governance is established.  
The government induced money to the public to encourage them to purchase 
individual households. The inducement tool, according to Elmore’s theory, money 
is an effective way to elicit performance. The policy did share the household 
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supply responsibility with private developers. It effectively continued the housing 
strategy.    
Policy Stream (III): Tung Chee-hwa’s 1997 Policy Address 
The situation 
Starting from 1995, the property price raised drastically. According to the 
statistics of Global Property Guide 2009, the residential property price raised 
71.5% from October 1995 to October 1997. People used more than three quarters 
of their salary on mortgage payment. The property price was high and 
unaffordable for low-class and middle-class families.  
In 1997 TUNG Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive, determined to 
suppress the housing problem. TUNG identified the high price was due to the 
insufficient housing supply and therefore announced the government would target 
to increase the overall housing supply to at least 85,000 flats per year. Apart from 
increasing the flats production under the government’s housing scheme, it also 
significantly increased the number of land supply and actively competed for 
property buyers with developers in private property market.  
The government’s proactive housing policy greatly intervened the equilibrium the 
residential property market. Soon after the announcement of the 85,000 policy, 
Hong Kong’s economy was impacted by the Asian financial and monetary crisis 
which appeared in late 1997. The property price dropped sharp to half of its 
original value. Governmental policy must take into consideration of its 
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environmental surrounds and implementations must also be adapted to the 
changing circumstances. Strict policies would only cause inflexible of the 
government.  
Governance and policy tools  
Since the failure of ‘85,000 policy’, the government took up the strategy of 
‘positive non-interventionism’. Being market driven, the housing market 
gradually became steady. Various measures, which the government has taken 
along the four directions since February 2010, ensured the healthy and stable 
development of the property market.  
Estate developers became more and more inconsistence with the government 
policies and directions. Therefore a more authoritative approach on controlling 
household building is essential.  
The top-down policy decisive is the typical interventionist governance, the 
governance maintained a hierarchical relationship with the private sectors. 
According to Knill and Tosun, the command and control highly detailed and 
legally binding by the Chief Executive’s policy address. 
The housing policy announcement in the policy address was a mandate policy 
according to Elmore’s theory. The government aggressively announced the 
inflexible ‘85,000 policy’, without taking consideration of socio-economic status 
at that time. It assumed that the public and private sector would work together in 
fulfilling the construction target. 
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Policy Stream (IV): Government Policies and related Developments 
concerning First-hand Residential Properties 
The situation 
In the 80s and early 90s of Hong Kong, inadequate and misleading sales 
information on uncompleted residential properties is common and of up surging 
concern to prospective buyers as they have no opportunity to view the properties 
physically to understand the details of the properties before their purchase.  
Many common problems such as inaccurate size of the property, misleading 
descriptions of fittings and finishes, misleading layout plan, sketches and location 
plans were rampant without proper control. Since 2000, more and more concerns 
have also been raised about the provision and dissemination of misleading 
information on the prices of property transactions and the related sales figures. As 
the number of such complaints grows and the properties are going up to sky-high 
price after the government non-intervention attitude towards housing policy with 
limited land supply after the failure of “85,000 policy”, there are increasing calls 
from the general public to establish timely measures to resolve the problems. 
Governance and policy tools 
To tackle the problems, government in the past adopted multi-pronged approach 
to monitor the sales of first-hand residential properties. More than one policy tool 
were used by the government to deal with the issue. This comprised the Lands 
Department’s Consent Scheme (“the Consent Scheme”), guideline of the Real 
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Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong (REDA), the regulatory work of the 
Estate Agents Authority (EAA) and the work of Consumer Council. Integrating 
with the theory by Knill and Tosun, the tools adopted could also be categorized 
into different governance models and it reflected that the Hong Kong Government 
had used a mixed governance model in different aspects of first-hand residential 
property sales to respond the issue. 
(a) Consent scheme. The Lands Department’s Consent Scheme (“the Scheme”) 
was introduced in 1961 and is administered by the Legal Advisory and 
Conveyancing Office (LACO) of Lands Department (Lands D). Commencing 
from 1961, all new leases normally contains a provision which restricts any 
assignment or letting of uncompleted units prior to the issue of Certificate of 
Compliance (CC) unless the prior written consent of the Director of Lands is 
obtained. A similar clause is also added to a lease when a developer submits 
redevelopment application, which involves a change of land use or lease 
modification to the Lands D. 
The Scheme allows the Director of Lands to ensure that the developer has 
complied with a set of requirements prior to the grant of the permission to sell the 
property under construction, and the purchasers will be protected by the Scheme.  
The original purpose of the Consent Scheme is to ensure the developer has 
adequate technical and financial resources to complete the development. Over the 
years, additional requirements were added in the Scheme for consumer protection 
and promoting fair practices in the sale of uncompleted properties. The relevant 
requirements include: 
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1. the financial standing of the developer and financing arrangements;  
2. the terms of the sale and purchase agreement; 
3. the terms of the deed of mutual covenant; 
4. contents of the sales brochure; and  
5. the way the pre-sale is to be carried out.  
In the cases that the developers were found to be in breach of the requirements 
under the Scheme, the developers will be asked to implement appropriate 
measures or take actions to rectify the breach. The Director of Lands may also 
take actions against the developers under the Scheme. The actions includes 
requesting the developer to give explanation or clarification as to the alleged 
breach, requiring immediate rectification of the breach, referring the matter to the 
relevant professional body for follow-up actions, giving written warning, 
requiring the developer to allow the purchasers to cancel the transactions and to 
obtain a full refund, and suspending/cancelling the consent given in respect of the 
unsold units where the circumstances of the case warrant.  
The Consent Scheme can be considered to be a kind of regulated self-governance. 
Regulated self-governance refers to constellations in which hierarchical 
intervention through legally binding rules is accompanies by more cooperative 
relationship between public and private actors (Knill and Tosun 2012, p.210). A 
land lease is actually a legally binding contract between the government and 
developer. However, the terms in the lease are not resulted from the bargaining 
processes between public and private actors on an equal standing. The 
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government plays a dominant role in the final decision on contents and regulatory 
arrangements.  
(b)Guideline of the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong (REDA). 
The REDA is the key trade association in the real estate industry. Since 2001, the 
REDA has monitored its members on the sale of uncompleted residential 
properties through a self-regulatory mechanism with a set of guidelines for them 
to comply with. The guidelines, which covered requirements on sales brochures, 
price lists, show flats, marketing materials, transaction information disclosure and 
sales arrangement, were reviewed from time to time on a need basis.  
The REDA has set up a Compliance Committee which comprises of members 
from its Executive Committee and independent members invited from solicitor 
firms to ensure the guidelines compliance. Cases of non-compliance with REDA 
guidelines will be referred to the Hearing Panel, which will deliberate and mete 
out disciplinary measures as appropriate. The disciplinary measures included 
issuing warning letter, private reprimand and public reprimand. Apart from 
handling the non-compliance case referral, random checks may also be conducted 
by Compliance Monitors (lawyers or CPAs) engaged by the REDA. As a 
monitoring measure, REDA members would also submit to the Compliance 
Committee a report prepared by an independent auditor certifying that the conduct 
of their sale was in compliance with the REDA’s guidelines.  
The self-regulatory mechanism of REDA is a type of private self-governance 
according to the theory of Knill and Tosun. The definition and implementation of 
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the policies are mostly in the hands of private actors. There are no legally binding 
instruments and the participation is on voluntary basis.  
(c) Estate Agents Authority (EAA). The EAA is a statutory body established under 
the Estate Agents Ordinance (EAO) in 1997. One of its major functions is to 
regulate the practice of estate agency in Hong Kong. Through issuing Practice 
Circular and the Code of Ethics, the EAA regulates the practice of estate agents 
and salespersons under EAO to protect the rights of the property purchasers. For 
the transactions related to first-hand properties, the EAA Practice Circular 
stipulates that the licensees are required to obtain necessary property information 
from the developers and then provide the prescribed information to the residential 
unit buyers. If it is established that licensees are in breach of the EAO, the 
Practice Circular or the Code of Ethics, the EAA may take disciplinary action 
against the licensees concerned.  
The regulatory framework of EAA is a type of interventionist governance. 
However, this governance is actually an indirect intervention. The EAA could 
only monitor the conduct of estate agents but not the developers, which actually 
sell the premises. Therefore, the purchaser’s right was protected by the regulations 
and duties imposed on the middlemen, instead of the vendors directly.  
(d) Consumer Council. The Consumer Council is established under the Consumer 
Council Ordinance to enhance consumer protection and consumer education.  
As to first-hand residential properties, the Consumer Council has jointly published 
with the EAA the “Notes to Purchasers of First-hand Residential Properties” 
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which would be included in the sales brochures of uncompleted first-hand 
residential properties under the Consent Scheme. The Consumer Council is also 
responsible for handling complaints from consumers, including first-hand 
property purchasers. The Council would examine the complaints and may take 
follow-up action in settling the disputes, including mediation. In case there are 
strong justifications supporting a complaint case, and the case may have far 
reaching implications on the public, the Consumer Council may advise the 
complainant to apply the Consumer Legal Action Fund, which provides financial 
support and legal assistance to applicants whose cases meet the eligibility criteria 
to take legal action.  
The Consumer Council is also a type of interventionist governance, although it is 
not specifically for regulating the sale of first-hand residential properties, but the 
transaction of all goods and services. This interventionist governance is also a 
mild one, since the Consumer Council did not have investigative and prosecution 
power, and the sanctions imposed was limited. 
Concluding Remarks 
The government has taken multi-dimensional approaches in order to tackle the 
underlying residential problems. However, the introduction of the above policies 
and establishment of regulating bodies cannot fully suppress the first-hand 
property overheated situation. In order to further enhance the regulations of the 
sale of first-hand private residential properties, in 2010 the government announced 
that the Transport and Housing Bureau has set up the Steering Committee on the 
Regulations of the Sale of First-hand Residential Properties by Legislation to 
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discuss specific issues pertaining to the regulations of the sale of first-hand 
properties by legislation. In the following chapters, this project will analyze the 
policy dynamics leading to change of the government policies on monitoring first-
hand residential properties. 
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CHAPTER 4 - DYNAMICS LEADING TO CHANGE IN THE 
POLICY GOVERNING THE SALE OF FIRST-HAND 
PROPERTIES 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is largely on the why there were elements of change in 
the policy governing the sale of first-hand properties. It appreciates the 
significance of the problem stream arising again concerning why the government 
sought to change the existing policy tools being used for governing the sale of 
first-hand properties. In essence, the ineffectiveness of the existing governance 
and policy tools and repeated failures to reform them lead to the government 
decision, as an aspect of the policy stream, to introduce a new ordinance to govern 
the sale of first-hand residential properties in 2012. The governance and policy 
tools adopted are evaluated, followed by a discussion of the significance of the 
political stream in terms of public mood, changes of administration and election. 
Re-emergence of the Problem Stream: Why did the government need to alter 
its responses to the sale of first-hand residential properties? 
Overview 
Buying a property in private market is likely to be the most significant investment 
of most people in Hong Kong. However, in the sale of first-hand residential 
properties, the vendors, i.e. real estate developers, and individual purchasers are 
usually not on an equal footing. Developers are always considered to be in a 
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stronger position and having greater bargaining power than the purchasers. Taking 
these advantages, the developers usually manipulate the sales procedures and 
selectively disclose property information in the sale process. Complaints against 
developers as to their problematic marketing strategies are common in 2000s. The 
complaints are mainly related to the unfair sales arrangements, inaccurate 
premises size and inaccurate property information. The natures of the problems 
revealed from these complaints are in fact similar to the fostering factors 
categorized by Freiberg, namely market failure, public interest, risk management 
and trust, which are helpful to understand the dynamics driving the government to 
change its policy towards the sale of first-hand residential properties in the 
community. 
Unfair sales arrangements  
It is commonly criticized that the sales arrangements, which are mostly 
administered by the developers, are unfavorable to purchasers. In order to boost 
the sales volume and push the purchasers to confirm the buying decision within a 
short period of time, the developers usually arrange purchasers artificially to be 
engineered inside a packed sales office with the heat of a buying frenzy and only 
be given piecemeal information. The agents would urge them to make decision or 
they would lose out to other eager buyers. Worse, in some cases, the slots for the 
seller's signature on the sales and purchase agreements are deliberately left blank 
to give the developers the option of rescinding the sale (SCMP, 23 August 2006). 
In this connection, the purchasers’ interests are greatly deprived under these 
unfavorable sales arrangements.  
41 
Inaccurate size information 
Another common complaint is the inaccurate size information of the premises. In 
Hong Kong, traditionally the transaction parties like to use Gross Floor Area 
(GFA) to calculate the price of properties. However, GFA actually cannot reflect 
the real size of the property, since GFA is the sum of its saleable area and its 
apportioned share of common area, which may differ from one developer to 
another. In addition, due to concessionary policy, exemptions were granted to 
amenities and green features, such as balconies and clubhouse, from the 
calculation of GFA when developers construct the buildings. Since developers are 
not required to pay land premium for most of these facilities but on the other hand 
can charge the purchasers for payment. These features become so excessive, and 
in extreme cases the payment can sum up to more than 20 per cent of the GFA. As 
such, it has been suggested for long to use the saleable floor area as the only basis 
in listing the price per square foot, to avoid buyers from being misled and to 
eradicate the problem of "shrunken flats". However, the developers usually defend 
that using GFA is a traditional practice and will face practical difficulties in 
changing the calculation.  
Remarkable cases – disseminate inaccurate property information  
Apart from the unfair sales arrangements and inaccurate property size information, 
the developers are also criticized to disseminate misleading property information 
in marketing the first-hand residential properties. Four remarkable cases are 
chosen to illustrate the seriousness of the problem.  
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(a) The Arch – misleading sales information regarding the completed transactions. 
In May 2005, a transaction of a penthouse unit in a luxury residential development, 
The Arch, attracted the public’s attention as to the dissemination of misleading 
transaction data by the developers to influence the sale of the residential 
development project. The developer, Sun Hung Kai Properties, was suspected to 
selectively disclose that a penthouse unit of over 5,000 square feet had been sold 
at a price of over $30,000 per square foot which was a price hitting levels not seen 
since 1997. However, the media later reported the transaction was actually 
associated with three four-bedroom apartments in the same development project at 
prices below the market price. 
The incident revealed how the developers could play tricks in the marketing 
strategy. The then Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands Michael Sun, 
mentioned that the internal sales system for unfinished flats was not transparent 
enough, and agreed that developers should provide a price list for all units and 
announce the accurate price for units sold. Actually, before Sun’s suggestion, the 
REDA had already formulated guidelines requiring the developer members to 
issue price list to purchasers, but apparently not all developers complied with the 
guidelines since it was not a legally binding requirement.  
Besides, the incident also uncovered the obsolete system of property transaction 
recording since lots of price-affecting information like cash rebate and other 
incentives offered by developers were not included in the records of Land 
Registry. 
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(b) 39 Conduit Road – inaccurate transaction price, sales figures and floor levels. 
In October 2009, a special unit at 39 Conduit Road, was sold at an “astronomical 
price’ of over $71,000 per square foot, breaking the world records. However, in 
December 2009, the public queried the transaction since the purchaser of that unit 
had also bought four lower floor flats at the same time. It was suspected that parts 
of the property cost of the lower floor units were transferred to the special unit, so 
as to deceive other prospective buyers. 
In March 2010, the 39 Conduit Road tower again attracted the spotlights. 
According to the Land Registry’s record, there should be only one luxury flat 
being sold, however the developer claimed that contracts had been signed for 24 
luxury flats. The legislators pressed the government to conduct investigation into 
the matter. 
In June 2010, it was discovered that the sale of 24 flats, among which 20 of the 
deals eventually fell through, included a top-floor duplex, which created the 
world-record $439 million. According to a survey conducted by the Middle Class 
Alliance, more than 85 per cent of the 526 middle-income interviewees believed 
that was an act of market manipulation by Henderson Land to boost property 
prices (SCMP, 12 July 2010).  
The 39 Conduit Road tower was also famous on its "creative" presentation of 
floor levels. The developer had skipped floor levels of number four, 13, 14, 24, 34, 
40 to 59, 62, 64, 65, 67 and 69 to 87. As a result, the 46-storey high tower became 
“88-storey” high, and the developer could market the top two floors of the luxury 
project as 68 and 88, which were recognized as lucky numbers in Chinese 
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numerology. The unrealistic floor numbering system misled the buyer’s 
perception on the value of the premises, because premises on higher floors could 
usually be sold at higher prices.  
(c) The Apex - misleading property location. In 2006, the advertisements 
promoting the property ‘The Apex” showed the stunning Manhattan cityscape 
with a model of the property and highlighted the project’s luxury clubhouse as 
well as proximity to the railway station. However, the promotion materials did not 
mention an important fact that the site was actually located in the busy industrial 
area in Kwai Chung (SCMP 11 September 2006). 
The misleading information provided by the developer was also condemned by 
the Broadcasting Authority. The Broadcasting Authority considered the slogan, 
which appeared in all advertisements versions, claimed that the property was 
situated in Kowloon area was misleading. Since the actual property location is in 
Kwai Chung, New Territories, according to the official definition of the New 
Territories provided by the Lands Department (SCMP, 11 September 2006). 
(d) Lake Silver – skipping unfavorable details in the sales brochure. In June 2009, 
a green group, Green Sense, together with Alan LEONG Kah-kit, a legislator from 
Civic Party, slammed the sales brochures of Lake Silver, which was developed by 
MTR Corporation and Sino Land in Wu Kai Sha, had covered some important 
facts which could affect the buyers' judgment. In the sales brochures, Laker Silver 
was depicted as a cluster of towers standing among green hills and sparkling shore. 
However, in reality the sea views would not last for long since most floors would 
be blocked by another property and will undergo development in future. The 
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artists’ impressions of skipping unfavorable details also misled purchasers in 
making their buying decision (SCMP, 8 June 2009). 
Overall significance of the problems 
The problems exposed in the above studies are numerous and diverse. While 
Kingdon’s theory mentioned that a phenomenon would turn into a problem when 
people were convinced that something should be done to make a change, there is 
no categorization regarding the nature of the problem bringing about such 
perception. Supplementing Kingdon’s theory, the fostering factors identified by 
Freiberg are used to further analyze how the problems mentioned above bring 
about the policy change action of the government.  
Freiberg divided the fostering factors, i.e. core and generic reasons, for the needs 
of government regulation into four categories, namely, public interest, market 
failure, risk management and trust. The problems reflected in the sales of first-
hand residential properties could be connected with these four categories as shown 
in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Problems in the first-hand residential property market 
Unfair sales arrangement and 
problematic marketing strategy
Inaccurate property size information –
information asymmetry
Misleading data on 
completed transaction
Inaccurate 
floor level
Public interest Market Failure Risk Management Trust 
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property 
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Skipping unfavorable 
details as to surrounding 
future development  –
information asymmetry
Obsolete record 
system of property 
transaction
 
 
(a) Public interest.  Almost all of the complaints are connected with public 
interest. Disseminating misleading sales information to influence public’s buying 
decision definitely harmed the public interest. It must be noted that the complaints 
are not just lodged against one or two major developers, but most of the 
developers, ranged from small players to market leaders. This reflected that 
playing tricks in the property marketing is a common culture, which is a serious 
conduct issue in the overall real estate industry. The non-equal-footing bargaining 
power between purchasers and developers further manifests the need of 
government to protect interest of the general public in the first-hand property sales.  
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Freiberg (2010) pointed out that social and informal mechanisms are basic modes 
of regulating private behavior. People will expect government to act on their 
behalf to produce regulatory outcomes when their interests are impaired by 
inadequacy of protection, market failure in quality services and threatening of 
public confidence. In this case, the establishment of the Ordinance is to a certain 
extent caused by the long history of inefficiency and disappointment from the 
traditional self-discipline regulatory mechanism adopted by the government over 
the sales of first-hand property. Potential buyers were long suffering from the 
unfair and misleading information provided by developers with minimal 
protection from the government. The substandard quality of services was long 
arising grievances from the public whom aired their dissatisfaction and demand 
against the government to take regulatory actions on their behalf. 
(b) Market failure. In the light of market failure, it can be seen that the market is 
inefficient to solve the problems. Information asymmetry between purchasers and 
developers always failed in the market. First of all, developers refused to provide 
saleable area information, but only provided GFA, were already an example of 
market failure resulting from information imbalance. Secondly, the developers 
usually retain information, especially in some uncompleted first-hand property 
sale, e.g. the quality, actual view and scene from the property, future development 
plan in surrounding areas. This information could affect the purchasing decision 
and price. However, the general public usually does not have sufficient knowledge 
to obtain that important information easily.  
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(c) Risk management. For the aspect of risk management, government realizes that 
if the problematic marketing practice continues, the property price will become 
sky-high and the public discontent will accumulate. By giving partial sales figures 
which are only favorable to vendors, skipping floor levels to create breaking new 
high unit price, or hiding the rebate or discount which cannot be reflected in the 
obsolete Land Registry database, the developers could easily boost up the 
property price. However, this is against the government’s objective in maintaining 
the property price at a public affordable level. After assessing the risk of high 
property price, the government is forced to change its regulating tools. 
(d) Trust. In regard to the aspect of trust, Freiberg focuses on the government’s 
great concern in maintaining public trust towards government administration. This 
is because high level of trust is conducive to regulatory system and lowering the 
transaction costs. Actually, trust is connected with the effectiveness of the existing 
policy tools. Effective the existing policy tools, results high public trust. Yet, the 
existing policy tools/mechanism are proven to be ineffective in monitoring the 
developers. This project will further discuss in the later parts on how the 
ineffectiveness of the existing institutional structures led to distrust from the 
public, thereby fostering government to revise its policy.  
Apart from the aspect of trust suggested by Freiberg, studies also reflected that 
government’s trust towards the self-regulators is an important factor in causing 
policy change. Under the self-regulatory regime of REDA, the developers had 
actually formulated guidelines requiring its members to issue price list to 
purchasers before sale. However, it was found that not all developers fully 
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compiled the guideline. During the years before the set up of Ordinance, the 
government actually had continuously advised and discussed with the REDA in 
order to fine-tune the self-regulatory mechanism. However, improvements were 
limited. Finally, the government lost trust on the REDA self-regulatory regime 
and decided to revolutionize the regulatory framework. 
A New Policy Stream: How has the government chosen the policy tools? 
Overview 
The policy stream is about how the government regulates and formulates the 
policy tools to solve the problem. The feasibility of a proposal relies on its 
technical viability, costs, supports from the public and politicians, as well as the 
indigenous value choices in the community (Kingdon, 1995; Cairney, 2012). The 
policy stream creates a short list of solutions, which is an agreement that some 
particular proposals are prominent (Kingdon, 1995). Prior to the Residential 
Properties (First-hand Sales) Ordinance, the government used multi-pronged 
approach with four major policy tools to regulate the first-hand residential 
property sale activities, namely the Consent Scheme, guideline issued by REDA, 
regulatory frameworks by the EAA and the Consumer Council. The consideration 
process in choosing these tools, which would affect the outcome and effectiveness 
of the tools, are worth examining in order to understand the policy-making 
process as well as policy change dynamics. It is found that with tilting focus on 
cost and resources, the existing policy framework is ineffective in accordance 
with the assessment criteria developed by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge and the 
factors identified by Freiberg. In addition to the repeated failures in the 
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optimization process, the government finally came up with the decision to 
introduce a new legislation to deal with the issue.  
Governance and policy tools 
The classifications of policy tools defined by Elmore (Elmore, 1987) are used to 
explain the choice of these tools. Applying Elmore’s framework, these four tools 
are mainly mandates, which are the authoritative rules or prescriptions governing 
the behavior of individuals and agencies. Details are illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 Types of policy tools according to Elmore's classification  
Policy Tools Elmore’s classification 
Lands Department’s Consent Scheme Mandates 
Real Estate Developers Association of 
Hong Kong (REDA) Mandates 
Estate Agents Authority (EAA) Mandates and Capacity Building 
Consumer Council Mandates 
(a) Consent Scheme. For the Consent Scheme, its original purpose is to monitor 
the behavior of the developers during the construction process, but later the 
government imposed additional requirements on the land lease during lease 
modification for consumer protection and promoted fair practices in the sale of 
uncompleted properties. Though the requirements are the contractual terms in the 
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land lease, this can be considered to be a kind of mandates, which involve rules of 
authoritative nature governing the behavior of the developers with an effect of 
producing compliance.  
According to Kingdon, the feasibility of a proposal relies on its technical viability, 
costs, supports from the public and politicians, as well as the indigenous value 
choices in the community (Kingdon, 1995). It is believed the choice of this policy 
is due to the consideration of technical viability and costs. When the community 
in 1990s requested for additional controls on the sales behavior of the developers, 
imposing more conditions on the land lease between the government and the 
developers was considered to be a fast and cost-effective solution. There is no 
legislation requirement for this administrative measure since adding conditions in 
the land lease is only the contractual issue between government and the developer. 
Without detailed legislative debates, the drawback of this solution is that the 
buyers of those first-hand uncompleted projects which have not undergone lease 
modification are not protected by the Consent Scheme.  
(b) Guideline of the REDA. The guideline of the REDA is also considered to be a 
policy tool of mandates. The REDA, through this self-regulatory regime, 
stipulates the rules to monitor its members in selling first-hand residential 
properties. The government welcomes this private self-governance from the 
consideration of cost. The government does not need to change the legislation. 
The policy making process is quick and simple, and the monitoring cost is 
relatively low since it is managed by the REDA itself. However, again, the 
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drawback of this fast-track solution is some of the first-hand property sites which 
are developed by non-REDA members are not regulated under the guideline.  
(c) Estate Agents Authority. In regard to the framework under the EAA, it is also a 
mandate to regulate, but targeted on different groups of real estate practitioners, 
i.e. estate agents. The estate agents are required to obtain a wide range of 
information regarding the properties before performing marketing works. The 
purpose of the requirement is to avoid developers from disseminating inaccurate 
property information with the scrutiny of estate agents. Therefore, this policy of 
mandate is indirect in nature and it ultimately regulates the real developers, rather 
than the estate agents.  
The choice of this policy tools is believed to be expediency before the specific 
legislation is set up for property developers. The government may consider the 
legislation under the EAA can be employed to regulate the first-hand residential 
property market without much additional resources. Yet, this framework under the 
EAA is full of loopholes since it neglects an important fact that the developers and 
estate agents are actually principal-agent relationship. Expecting an agent to 
monitor the work of its principal is ironic in nature.  
In another sense, the work of the EAA can also be categorized as a kind of 
capacity building measures since the EAA will from time to time require estate 
agents to attend seminars or programmes to enhance their knowledge and ethics in 
the property sale. This is a kind of investment intending to create long-term effect 
for better consumer protection to the property buyers.  
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(d) Consumer Council. The work of Consumer Council is another tool of 
mandates. Consumer Council Ordinance is the authoritative rule governing the 
behavior of all sellers in all kinds of transactions, including from first-hand 
residential property developers.  
Considering no additional resource is required, the government makes use of the 
framework of Consumer Council as one of the tools to regulate the developers. 
The vendors, i.e. the developers, should comply with the broad-spectrum rules of 
consumer protection. However, the conveyance procedure is very complicated, 
the general rules only advocate consumer interests are weak in general to monitor 
the sales process of first-hand properties which is full of rooms for playing tricks.  
(e) Overall significance. It could be found that these four policy tools are chosen 
to a large extent due to the considerations on cost and resources involved. For the 
sake of expediency, legislative debates are not thorough in the formulation 
process of these tools.  
Due to excessive attention put on the cost and resources in the policy-making 
process, the outcomes of these chosen tools are not effective and complementary 
as expected. With the evaluation and review on the deficiency on the existing 
policy tools via objective assessment criteria identified by Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012 p.26-31) and factors suggested by 
Freiberg (2010), the government may again need to make a choice to 
reform/optimize the existing policy tools or adopt a big bang of system changing. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the above cycle.  
 Figure 4.3 Cycle on policy-making process 
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Evaluation of the existing policy tools 
Adopting the five assessment criteria developed by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge and 
two factors identified by Freiberg, these four existing policy tools can be 
objectively and systematically evaluated. The five assessment criteria and two 
important factors, including (i) Legitimacy; (ii) Effectiveness; (iii) Accountability; 
(iv) Due Process; (v) Expertise; (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012) (vi) Efficiency; 
and (vii) Autonomy (Freiberg, 2010). It is found that each policy tool has its own 
inadequacy, leaving some loopholes for market practitioners to play tricks and 
circumvent the regulations. 
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Consent Scheme: problems in legitimacy and effectiveness. Though the Consent 
Scheme administered by Lands D is led by a group of real estate professionals, it 
is found that the Scheme is inadequate in terms of Legitimacy and Effectiveness.  
For the criteria of Legitimacy, Consent Scheme is not a legislation or regulation 
created via a legislative process with thorough debates by lawmakers. Strictly 
speaking, it is only a clause inserted by the government in the land lease, a legally 
binding contract between the government and developer during lease modification. 
In this connection, the legislative mandate is not strong enough. Lacking 
comprehensive legislative debates also resulted in the flaws in the Consent 
Scheme and affected its effectiveness. The original purpose of the Scheme is to 
ensure developers have adequate technical and financial resources to complete 
uncompleted projects but not for consumer protection in the sales of all first-hand 
properties. Without detailed planning, some of the primary projects are found 
unprotected by the Scheme.  
As for the redevelopment projects on the sites where the leases are ‘unrestricted 
leases’, i.e. lands sold or granted in the early colonial period (so-called Non-
Consent Scheme Sites), there are no restriction on the development of potential or 
land use stipulated in the lease terms. In this regard, the developers are not 
required to submit any lease modification in the redevelopment process and thus 
the Lands D has no opportunity to add the clauses related to the Scheme to the 
leases concerned. As a result, the purchasers of the first-hand properties built on 
such sites were unprotected by the Scheme.  
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Developers sometimes would make use of this loophole to formulate the sales 
arrangement, which were favorable to them. For example, in September 2006, 
Henderson Land requested the prospective buyers to pay $100,000 to enter ballot 
for flats in the Grand Waterfront project in To Kwa Wan, in order to ensure only 
serious buyers joined the ballot. This arrangement was inconsistent with the rules 
under the Consent Scheme properties which the developers could only accept a 
deposit of about five per cent of the purchase price when the buyer signed a 
provisional agreement for sale and purchase. Yet, the site in To Kwa Wan was not 
a site under the Consent Scheme. Hence, Henderson’s arrangement did not violate 
any rules.  
The ineffectiveness of the Lands D was also criticized by Mr. LEE Wing-tat, 
Legislative Council Member, during the legislative debate of the bill. He 
pinpointed his dissatisfaction about the performance of the Lands D and the 
Buildings Department for their buck-passing attitude. He said “while there are 
many different enforcement bodies, I am particular dissatisfied with the Lands D 
and the Buildings Department for the supervision of uncompleted developments 
in respect of the implementation of the Consent Scheme”. He pointed out that 
even the two departments were working under the same cabinet; surprisingly they 
were not prepared to communicate with each other. This reflected that individual 
departments have its own agenda and when difficult situation arise which requires 
full cooperation and devotion the effectiveness may not be as good as the public 
expected. This is particularly noteworthy when there is no external driven force 
urging them to take timely actions. 
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Estate Agents Authority (EAA): problems in legitimacy and effectiveness. The 
EAA is a statutory body established to regulate the practice of estate agency in 
Hong Kong, but not the practice of real estate developers. Its legitimacy to 
regulate the conduct of the developers is actually in doubt. Without a legislation 
specifically to regulate the developers directly, the government could only impose 
duties on the estate agents in the transaction process to minimize the 
dissemination of misleading information. The estate agents are required to get a 
wide range of information regarding the properties before performing their 
marketing works. However, in the first-hand property transaction, the estate 
agents are mostly the agent solely representing the developer, instead of 
purchasers. Imposing duties on the estate agents to monitor the conducts of their 
principal is sarcastic in fact. The estate agents tend to put the interest of their 
principal in a higher priority and the effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism is 
greatly weakened due to the conflict-of-interest situation.  
Consumer Council: problems in expertise, efficiency and effectiveness. Although 
the Consumer Council is set up to enhance consumer protection, it lacks expertise 
to monitor the sale of real estate properties and involves a wide range of 
knowledge on land policy and conveyancing. As commented by Dr. Margaret NG, 
Legislative Council Member, in the Legislative Council Debate on the Residential 
Properties (First-hand Sales) Ordinance, she pointed out that transaction of 
properties involves very specialized legal services and the government focused 
merely on the protection of consumers’ rights, fraud prevention and penalties but 
neglected that the inclusion of the relevant provisions into the legislation without 
adequate conveyance expertise may give rise to many problems.  
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In addition, the Consumer Council itself is not tailor-made for regulating the sale 
of first-hand residential properties, but the transactions of all goods and services. 
It is rather difficult for the Council to deploy lots of resources to enhance 
efficiency in monitoring the conduct of various real estate developers. Moreover, 
facing the sales malpractice on properties, what the Consumer Council can do is 
to disclose the name of concerned vendors to the public or offer legal assistance to 
the consumers through Consumer Legal Action Fund. The Consumer Council has 
no authority to instruct or direct the vendors to comply anything, or even proceed 
in taking legal actions against the vendors direct. Without any investigative and 
prosecution power, the regulatory framework under the Consumer Council is 
ineffective. 
Guideline of the REDA: problems in legitimacy and due process. One of the major 
problems of the REDA self-regulatory mechanism is its inadequacy on legitimacy, 
i.e. insufficient legislative mandate to impose legitimate power for regulation. The 
REDA is only an industry body, instead of a regulator. Its major function was not 
to regulate the real estate developers or impose any sanctions to them in case of 
misconduct. In this regard, violating the non-legally-binding guidelines set up by 
the REDA will not cause serious consequences. In addition, developers are not 
required to be members of REDA in order to start their real estate business in 
Hong Kong. If they disagree with the directions or visions of the REDA, they 
could quit freely. The legitimacy of the REDA self-regulatory regime is only 
established on a voluntary-based compliance of its member developers, which is 
rather weak in nature.  
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Due to the membership requirement in enforcing the guidelines, the REDA self-
regulatory mechanism is also found to be ineffective in some cases. The 
deficiency is manifested in the case of Icon, a first-hand residential project 
developed by Winfoong International in 2011. In January 2011, several buyers of 
Icon found the new premises they purchased were rubbish-dump flats with 
unacceptable conditions, which included exposed flooring, unfurnished walls and 
unfinished kitchens. Contrary to the guideline of REDA and the Consent Scheme, 
they were only given promotional leaflets rather than official sales brochures prior 
purchasing the uncompleted flats. However, the site was not under the rules of 
Consent. The REDA guideline also could not govern Winfoong International 
since Wingfoong is not a member of REDA. That is to say, if a developer who is 
not a member of the REDA carries out a redevelopment project on a non-Consent 
Scheme site in Hong Kong, there is no law or regulation in monitoring the project 
or supervising the sale of the uncompleted buildings (China Daily, 27 January 
2011). 
Lack of due process is also found in the REDA regulatory framework. According 
to Baldwin and Cave (1999, p.79), due process is important since public support is 
merited because the regulator adopts fair, accessible and open procedure. Proper 
democratic influence over regulatory framework is then protected by due process, 
thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the regulation. From the guideline of REDA, 
the due process is hardly observed. Although there is a Compliance Committee in 
the REDA handling non-compliance complaints, it does not disclose the 
disciplinary cases to public. Those random checking mechanism and other 
monitoring measures are also far from transparent. Mr. LEE Wing-tat, Legislative 
Council Member, during the legislative debate also provided similar comments as 
to lack of due process under REDA framework. He mentioned, “The outcome of 
self-discipline is that often after receiving complaints, they will accept views, but 
it will happen all over again next time. Although the relevant committee of REDA 
has conducted meetings, no developer has ever been punished or even warned. I 
really find it ridiculous if the government still considers self-discipline a success 
after these incidents”. 
Overall significance. In accordance with the criteria by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 
and Freiberg, apparent flaws in the existing institutional structures are identified. 
Without a centralized legislation, these policy tools are not mutually reinforcing 
and leaving grey areas not being covered. Figure 4.4 shows how these four policy 
tools are not complimentary in terms of different kinds of land leases, first-hand 
residential properties and REDA memberships of the developers. 
Figure 4.4  Deficiency of the policy tools in terms of different kinds of land 
leases, first-hand properties and REDA memberships 
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Recognizing the ineffectiveness: reform or big bang of system changing? 
Recognizing the flaws of the existing tools, the government actually has an option 
to reform them, instead of replace the regulatory framework by setting up a new 
ordinance. In fact, the government had taken a number of actions to optimize and 
reform the tools. However, due to the limitation of the existing institutional 
structure, it was difficult to greatly improve the effectiveness of those tools. In this 
section, the measures taken by the government tried to optimize the tools are 
discussed, and it is concluded that repeated failures to reform will lead to a big 
bang system changing finally. 
a) Measures after the misleading sales information of The Arch  
After the incident of the Arch in 2005, the government, legislators and the public 
highly criticized the dishonest marketing strategy of the developers. The 
government urged the REDA to improve its guidelines on sales of primary 
residential projects. The REDA pledged to set up a special committee to review 
the guidelines that governed the sale of uncompleted properties. Subsequently, the 
REDA announced three measures to improve transparency of apartment sales 
figures, including issuing price list whenever new batch of flats is released for sale 
and sales figure publicized would only cover those legitimate sales with the 
preliminary agreement of sale and purchase signed. 
However, in August 2006, television footage showed estate agents apparently 
selling the flats of Park Island, a new property project of Sun Hung Kai Properties, 
and demanding buyers to pay $50,000 before they can read the price list of flats. 
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This reflected the developer actually did not follow the new guideline issued by 
the REDA. 
b) Measures after warning given by the government in 2006 
In August 2006, the government forewarned the developers that tough measures, 
including legislation, would be considered to regulate sales of uncompleted flats if 
developers were repeated reported that they did not complied with the guideline 
laid down by the REDA (24 August 2006 SCMP). The rules of the REDA were 
also considered to be inadequate to prevent dubious sales techniques of the 
developers. The common sales techniques of the developers were to put a small 
number of flats on the market and priced them at slightly below the market price. 
The units would then be quickly absorbed. Subsequent batches would then put on 
sale to the large number of purchasers who have missed out, or thought they have 
missed out, in the first round. Yet the sales method of these additional batches to 
the initial lot was not governed by the guideline by the REDA. Crucially, meaning 
the developers were not even obliged to distribute price lists for all the flats 
available for sale (SCMP, 23 August 2006). 
After meetings with the government, the Consumer Council, EAA and REDA 
agreed to revise the guideline as to the sale of first-hand residential properties. 
The developers were bound to put at least 20 units or 20 percent of the total 
number of flats, whichever is greater, for sale as the first batch. The price list must 
be provided 24 hours before the sale and for subsequent batches the price lists 
should be made readily available once the sales were announced. The government 
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agreed to give time to test new guideline before it considered regulating by 
legislation. 
c) Measures after criticism on skipping unfavorable details in the sales brochure 
in June 2009 
In October 2009, in response to the criticism of misleading pictures and details in 
sales brochures, e.g. Laker Silver, the REDA again revised its guideline to require 
the developers to put nearby residential developments and unpopular facilities, 
such as landfill sites and cargo working areas, on location maps in sales brochures. 
Besides, the brochure should also include the Consumer Council's notes to buyers 
and a Chinese translation of the Deed of Mutual Covenant. Sales brochures must 
not include any artists' impressions or graphics. For other promotional materials, 
disclaimer should be added in those artists' impressions. However, it ruled out 
penalizing those who violated the guideline. The guideline was still not legally 
bind and the REDA insisted that self-regulation is still the best way in regulating 
the sale of first-hand properties (SCMP 8 October 2009). 
d) Government attitude after the unusual skipping floor levels of 39 Conduit Road 
in 2009 
Soon after the release of revised guideline by the REDA in early October 2009, 
the media reported the unusual skipping floor levels and inaccurate transaction 
figures regarding the project of 39 Conduit Road. The Henderson Land 
Development was condemned for its skipping 48 floor numbers in its 39 Conduit 
Road apartment tower and misleading released sales figures to create 
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“astronomical price’ of over $71,000 per square foot. The action of Henderson 
again raised the public concern about misleading information disseminated by the 
developers. The self-regulation mechanism had nothing to do in this case, since 
the REDA guideline did not included regulations on floor numbering systems. 
In response to this incident, the legislators, including those in the pro-
establishment camp, suggested to regulate the sale of primary residential projects 
by setting up a designated statutory body (SCMP 20 October 2009). At this 
juncture, despite of the advocacy for policy change, government still inclined to 
maintain the status quo. The then Secretary for Transport and Housing Ms. Eva 
CHENG responded that the government had no plan to establish a watchdog to 
regulate the primary property market since the sales of uncompleted properties 
were governed by the Lands D, Consumer Council, REDA and other relevant 
legislations, including the Misrepresentation Ordnance and Theft Ordinance 
(SCMP 3 December 2009). 
e) Measures after media reported the collapsed deals of 39 Conduit Road in 2010 
In March 2010, it was revealed the 23 deals, out of 24 claimed transactions, in 39 
Conduit Road were registered in the record of Land Registry. The developer was 
suspected of manipulating the market to boost property prices, though Henderson 
Land claimed to the Lands D that the sale transactions of those flats would be 
completed by July 2010.  
In this connection, the government decided to tighten the control on the sale of 
first-hand residential properties, though it was still within the existing institutional 
65 
structure of the REDA guideline. In April 2010, Financial Secretary Mr. John 
TSANG requested the REDA to issue new guideline on nine proposals as follows:  
(1) Developers should duly observe REDA's guideline in selling all 
uncompleted and completed first-hand private residential properties; 
(2) Developers should provide on-site unit(s) at the development for the 
public to visit when selling completed first-hand residential 
properties; 
(3) Developers should indicate, at the same time when making public 
the transaction information under the existing "five-day disclosure 
rule" on transactions, those transactions which involve members of 
the Board, and their immediate family members; 
(4) Show flats have to comply with a list of requirements, including the 
requirement that there should be at least one show flat showing the 
same conditions of the actual flat to be handed over to buyers upon 
completion in respect of internal partitions, fittings and finishes, and 
complimentary appliances; 
(5) More units should be included in the first price list. For small-scale 
development, the minimum number of units to be included will be 
30 units or 30 per cent of the total number of units available for sale, 
whichever is the higher. For large-scale development, the minimum 
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number of units to be included will be 50 units or 50 per cent of the 
total number of units available for sale, whichever is the higher; 
(6) The requirement for making public the sales brochures should be 
advanced from the existing 24 hours prior to the commencement of 
sale to seven days prior to the commencement of sale; 
(7) Developers should make public the price list at least three days in 
advance of the commencement of sale when selling any number of 
units to whichever parties; 
(8) Promotional materials of the development should clearly provide 
the name of the district where the development is located and the 
address of the development; and 
(9) Developers should concurrently upload the sales brochures and all 
the price lists onto their websites. 
In July 2010, it was reported that out of the 24 claimed transactions in the 39 
Conduit Road, 20 of the deals were cancelled, including the one which was sold at 
an “astronomical price’ of over $71,000 per square foot.  
Facing the repeated serious problematic transactions, the government eventually 
changed its attitude on the necessity of policy change. The then Chief Executive 
Mr. Donald TSANG mentioned that the government would study the possibility 
of introducing legislation to step up regulation of sales of uncompleted flats and 
the scope for the legislation if nine measures announced in April 2010 to increase 
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transparency in flat sales proved ineffective. As said by TSANG, he “will use the 
opportunity [arising from the 39 Conduit Road saga] to resolve the problem of 
unfairness and lack of transparency in property transactions. There have been 
growing calls for laws to tighten regulation of sales of uncompleted residential 
flats after the high-priced sales of 20 luxury flats at 39 Conduit Road trumpeted 
by the developer, Henderson Land, fell through (SCMP 14 July 2010).  
f) Developer’s non-compliance situations after nine measures on the REDA 
guideline 
After nine measures on the REDA guideline announced in April 2010, there were 
still non-compliance situations discovered in various primary projects, including 
The Hermitage in Olympics by Sino Land, Lavotto in Ap Lei Chau and Lime 
Stardom in Tai Kok Tsui by Sun Hung Kai Properties.  
In response to the unsatisfactory improvements, the government requested two 
more measures to be added in the REDA’s guideline. One of them required 
developers to announce the buyer’s identity and exact date of completion within 
five days of signing a provisional agreement for sale and purchase. The other 
measure required developers to disclose the cancellation of any transaction on 
their company website as soon as possible. Green Sense and Democratic Party 
also called for a mandatory requirement to make an unmodified flat by the 
developers in primary residential sale to raise transparency. The Consumer 
Council also suggested establishing an online property information platform for 
first-hand residential property transactions. 
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g) Measures announced in 2010-11 Policy Address 
Paving the way for setting up legislation, in October 2010 the then Chief 
Executive TSANG announced in his Policy Address that a steering committee 
would be set up to discuss specific issues on regulating the sale of first-hand flats 
by legislation and put forward practicable recommendation within one year. 
h) The incident of the rubbish-dump flats in the Icon 
In January 2011, the incident of the rubbish-dump flats in the Icon fortified the 
public demand for legislation to regulate the sale of first-hand properties. One 
incident following another exposed that there was a lack of self-discipline in the 
sector and that it was difficult to ensure fair trade and protect the basic rights of 
the consumers giving the government no alternative but to plan to legislate for 
regulation (Singtao Daily, 28 June 2011). 
i) Recommendations of the Steering Committee on Regulation of Sale of First-
hand Residential Properties by Legislation 
After the set up of the Steering Committee, it has completed its work and 
submitted a detail report to the Secretary for Transport and Housing in October 
2011. In the report, the Steering Committee recommended that legislation should 
be introduced in order to effectively regulate the sale of first-hand residential 
properties. This included the projects developed under previous lease conditions, 
Consent Scheme projects, projects outside the Consent Scheme, etc. The report 
also came up with detailed recommendations on the requirements on sales 
69 
brochures, price lists, show flats, transaction information, advertisement, sales 
arrangements, prohibition on misrepresentation and dissemination of false and 
misleading information, penalties, enforcement authority, exemption 
arrangements, etc.  
j) Incident of Oceanaire Garden Residence and Providence Peak 
Based on the Steering Committee’s recommendations, THB prepared a draft 
legislation attached to the Consultation Paper on the Proposed Legislation in order 
to regulate the sale of first-hand residential properties. This Consultation Paper 
was eventually released in November 2011 with a two-month public consultation 
period. According to the government, the Consultation Paper has received 
widespread support in regulating the sales of first-hand residential properties by 
legislation, and that the proposals set out in the draft legislation were generally 
welcomed and accepted by the public and relevant stakeholders. The only 
exception was that from REDA as their benefit is affected by the proposed 
requirements and changes. 
The developers at this juncture still insisted self-regulatory regime from the 
REDA could solve the problem. However, the disputes as to the ground level of 
flat sales in Oceanaire Garden Residence and Providence Peak were like the straw 
that broke the camel’s back.  
In March 2012, a purchaser of the newly completed Oceanaire Garden Residence 
in Ma On Shan complained that the flat was actually situated on the ground level 
while the floor level stated in the sales brochure was on podium level just below 
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“the fifth floor”. In June 2012, the Providence Bay of Sino Land was also 
complained by purchasers that its ground floor level was lower than the level of 
cycle way outside the property. The flats on the ground floor level were actually 
built on the basement level. These incidents just reminded the public again the 
need of legislation to protect first-hand property consumers could not be delayed. 
As a result, the bill was then finally passed on 29 June 2012 in Legislative 
Council.  
Overall significance. According to Elmore, system changing relates to the 
institutional change of relationship among policy actors. The key interest groups, 
stakeholders, their corresponding motivation and beliefs as well as the resources 
should be identified. The effectiveness of the strategies that the government 
adopted in dealing with the politics should be studied and evaluated in terms of 
coalition-building, reducing resistance, mobilization of appropriate actors, 
matching policy environments with appropriate policy design and choose of 
appropriate arenas, as appropriate (May, 2005, p.142-146). Setting up a new 
legislation to monitor the sale of first-hand residential property sale is no doubt a 
system changing. It could be seen that the strategies that the government adopted, 
i.e. repeated reforms on the former policy tools, are ineffective. However, such 
repeated failures actually helped in coalition-building and reducing resistance in 
setting up a new legislation. The public consensus for the institutional change is 
gradually formed. In addition that the matching political environment, in terms of 
the Political Stream to be discussed in following part, helped mobilizing the 
appropriate policy actors, a big bang system changing thus takes place.  
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The Political Stream: Agendas priority influenced by public mood, changes 
of administration and elections 
Overview 
Knill and Tosun mentioned that the affecting factors towards the choice of 
governance model included the political context, resources and power of different 
actors (Knill and Tosun 2012, 212). The view is actually echoed by Kingdon’s 
political stream, which is made up of public mood, pressure group campaigns, 
election and changes of administration. These components greatly influenced the 
agendas and the priority of policy issues.  
Public mood 
In the context of legislation on first-hand residential property sale, it could be seen 
that the public mood was all favorable to the policy change during the years prior 
to the establishment of the legislation. The improper marketing strategies of the 
developers had become fiercer in the years before the enactment of the Ordinance. 
In addition to the rocket-up property price, the public condemned the 
government’s inability in the housing policy and demanded stepping up the 
regulations on real estate developers.  
With repeated problematic cases on first-hand property sale, monitoring the 
conduct of real estate developers become the common consensus in the society. 
As commented by Ms. Audrey EU, LegCo Member, in the debate of the bill, the 
cheated cases in property transactions aroused serious public concerns. She said 
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“among these cases which properties were sold at sky-high prices, only 
subsequently proven be fabricated and the relevant transactions were cancelled in 
the aftermath. There were also cases of developers skipping the floor numbers, 
such that a building of only 30 to 40 storeys high turned out to have some 60 
storeys. Apart from the cases of skipping the floor numbers, there were cases of 
diminishing storeys. A buyer thought that the flat he bought was on the fifth floor, 
but it turned out that it was actually at the ground level. These cases have spurred 
even greater public outcry for legislation to regulate the transaction of first-hand 
residential properties.”  
Change of Administration 
2012 is the year when the legislation on first-hand residential property sale put to 
vote in Legislative Council. Coincidentally, this year is also the final year of the 
then Chief Executive Donald TSANG at his post. To lay some important merits 
and achievements in housing area before his leaving, he was eager to set up this 
legislation. This could be reflected from his last two Policy Addresses that he put 
housing policy as the first topic with over 40 pages to illustrate the mid and long 
term strategies.  
Double-election year 
The problems regarding the sale of first-hand property has been existed for many 
years but actions taken by political stakeholders to tackle them were limited. Ms. 
EU during the LegCo debate in June 2002 expressed her opinions on this 
phenomenon. She said “when I became a member of the Consumer Council in the 
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1980s, I came across many cases related to the buying and selling of properties 
and learnt, in particular, how unfair the consumers were treated. Despite that the 
Consumer Council often voiced out on the problems related to the buying and 
selling of properties, the government had all along refused to legislate. Then in the 
1990s, I participated in several studies of the Law Reform Commission (LRC) 
related to the regulation to be imposed on the buying and selling of properties. We 
published many reports, one after the other, on overseas sales of properties, local 
uncompleted developments and transactions of local flats for resale after 
conversion. However, all these published reports were shelved by the 
government.” Ms. EU in 2000 queried the government the reason of withdrawing 
the white bill concerning buying and selling of properties. Ms. EU mentioned, 
“the official replied that the white bill had met with opposition from the 
developers and this was the only reason. He said that certain provisions of the 
legislation concerned might involve criminal liability. And, as commercial 
developers are often companies, which naturally had directors, those provisions 
might hold the directors criminally liable in some cases. Therefore, the developers 
opposed and the government had to withdraw the white bill”.  
Mr. LEE Wing-tat’s comment in the debate also pointed out the great influential 
power of developers in the past. He said “government in the past used to have 
faith in the developers, as well as the REDA. REDA suggested a decade or two 
ago to let the industry resolve the problems by self-discipline. All attempts to 
regulate the behavior of businessmen by relying on their self-discipline rather than 
introducing legislation have failed according to my experience”. 
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Kingdon (1995) pointed out that consensus building is influenced by bargaining. 
Governmental official would assess the extent of consensus among organized 
political. Stakeholders would take part in the bargaining process to protect their 
interests or gain some benefits. It is clear that in the past the strong influential 
power of the private developers had deterred the government from putting the 
issue on its policy agenda.  
The political force to the policy change became stronger when elections came. 
Year 2012 was a double-election year. Both the election of Chief Executive and 
election of Legislative Council Members were held in 2012. This created an 
opportunity for the government to put the issue on its policy agenda. In addition to 
the increasing public discontent towards the developers arising from their 
problematic marketing strategies, the attitude of the government and the 
legislative members also adjusted. To win voters’ support, the candidates of the 
Chief Executive and the Legislative Council Members, regardless of pro-
establishment or pan-democratic, all demanded for setting up a new legislation to 
monitor the primary residential property sale.  
The comment of Mr. LEUNG Kwok Hung, the legislator, in the third reading 
debate of the legislation on monitoring first-hand property sale is best illustrating 
this fact. He commented “had this year not been the election year, there would not 
have been so many people supporting this Bill” (Legislative Council Hansard, 29 
June 2012, 16999). 
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Concluding Remarks 
Kingdon’s three-stream theory is adopted to analyze why the government seeks to 
change the previous policy tools being used for governing the sale of first-hand 
properties. Integrating with the categorization identified by Freiberg, it is found 
that a number of problems in relation to public interest, market failure, risk 
management and trust driving the change. From the perspective of policy stream, 
it is suggested that excessive attention was put on cost and resources implication 
when choosing the policy tools, causing the outcomes of the chosen tools are not 
comprehensive and effective as expected. With reference to the assessment 
criteria suggested by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge as well as the factors by Freiberg 
in assessing the institutional framework, it is found that the existing governance 
frameworks are far behind satisfactory. Noting the problems, the government has 
attempted to reform the tools. Yet, the repeated reforms are ended in failure, 
causing the government had no choice but to introduce a new ordinance to govern 
the sale of first-hand residential properties in 2012. For the political stream, the 
political context in 2012 and timing of change of administration in Legislative 
Council and Chief Executive Office created a mood for different actors to support 
changing the policy. All the three streams under Kingdon worked closely and 
knotted together leading to the open of “Policy Window” which brought the 
Ordinance to the top of Government policy agenda for a smooth and quick 
legislation. 
In the next chapter, the policy dynamics of the Residential Properties (First-hand 
Sales) Ordinance after its enactment will be discussed through the three-stream 
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model, and its effectiveness will also be evaluated to see whether the situation 
requiring choice of policy tools arises again after this big bang system changing.  
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CHAPTER 5 - POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DYNAMICS OF THE 
ORDINANCE 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the policy and administrative dynamics of the Ordinance are 
discussed with reference to the Kingdon’s three-stream model. It recognizes that 
the new Ordinance has addressed various historical problems in the first-hand 
residential property market. However, in the aspect of the problem stream, the 
problems arising from the abuse of given freedoms in the Ordinance create 
dynamics to optimize or substitute this new policy tool. Under the policy stream, 
the significance of the rush legislative process prior to the enactment of the 
Ordinance, which is considered to have negative effect on the outcome and 
effectiveness of the Ordinance, is discussed. With the relatively smooth 
implementation progress of the Ordinance and no strong public desire from the 
political stream for substituting the Ordinance, maintaining the status quo of the 
existing regulatory framework under the Ordinance is concluded, although there 
are rooms for improvement in various aspects with reference to the assessment 
criteria identified by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) as well as Freiberg (2010). 
Overview of the Ordinance 
The Residential Properties (First-hand Sales) Ordinance come into effect on 29 
April 2013. Its relevant provisions had set out very detailed requirements targeting 
the provide of sales brochures, price lists, show flats, disclosure of transaction 
information, advertisements, sales arrangements, and the mandatory provisions for 
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the Preliminary Agreement for Sale and Purchase, and Agreement for Sale and 
Purchase against the sales of first-hand residential properties. It also provides 
prohibitions requirement to prevent property developers from mis-representation 
and the delivering false or misleading information on the properties. In this 
Ordinance the relevant offences and legal liability are also created so as to target 
the possible contravention of the provisions 
In response to the problems connected with the four categories, namely public 
interest, market failure, risk management and trust, identified by Freiberg as 
shown in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4, the Ordinance incorporated clauses with the 
requirements that the developers should comply within the sale process.  
To protect public interest, the Ordinance requires the developers must make 
available the sales brochure for at least a period of seven days before the date of 
sale and on a date of sale. The developers also have to provide price lists and the 
documents containing the sales arrangements for at least a period of three days 
before the date of sale. In order to reduce the information asymmetry, which could 
cause market failure, the sales brochures should also provide a wide range of 
information, including aerial photos of the developments and various statutory 
plans, which indicated the possible future surrounding developments. To increase 
public trust and manage the risk of rising property price due to misleading 
transaction data, the Sales of First-hand Residential Properties Authority (SPRA) 
does not rely on the obsolete record system of property transactions in Land 
Registry, but established a central electronic database which contain the sales 
brochures, price lists, and registers of transactions of individual first-hand 
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residential developments the sale of which is subject to the Ordinance for the 
public inspections. 
Re-emergence of the Problem Stream: Voices to Review the Ordinance 
Abuse of the given freedom in the Ordinance: special sales tactics 
One year after the enactment of the Ordinance, the Director of SRPA, Mr. Eugene 
FUNG said that the Ordinance had been implemented under good progress in past 
year. According to the findings of Eugene FUNG, the Ordinance was found 
running smoothly and effective in enhancing the transparency, fairness and order 
of the sales of first-hand residential properties (HKSAR Government Press 
Release, 29 April 2014). However, it was found that some developers had made 
use of the existing freedoms on sales arrangement under the Ordinance, which 
were originally designed to facilitate flexible business decisions of the developers, 
to manipulate the sale procedures to boost up the sales advantage of the 
developers. This eventually leading to public grievances as their interest was 
impaired. 
For instance, some developers would schedule the "internal sale/sale to bulk 
purchasers" session and the sale sessions for all other prospective purchasers on 
the same day when the residential properties is being put on sale. In fact, the 
premises offered for sale and the sales procedures in all sessions are the same. 
This arrangement would confuse prospective purchasers in having a clear picture 
about the actual number of residential properties available for sale beforehand. 
The purchasers could only acquire limited information in drawing their buying 
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decisions. Secondly, some developers disclose a lower price for the residential 
properties solely for promotional purposes. Eventually, the developers are found 
not offering to sell those properties at such a lower price but a marked-up price in 
the official launch afterwards. 
Mr. Eugene FUNG commented that in order to strike a balance between the aim 
of enhancing transparency and fairness of sales of first-hand residential properties, 
and the right of the developers to legally dispose of their assets, the Ordinance 
does not prescribe categorically the types of sales arrangement which vendors 
must deploy (HKSAR Government Press Release, 29 April 2014). Accordingly, 
this is actually a freedom leaving for developers to facilitate their business 
decisions. Yet, from the above two examples, it is revealed that such freedom is 
sometimes abused.  
Another example relates to a primary residential project, Mont Vert, in Tai Po 
developed by Cheung Kong Properties in 2014. It was criticized for barring 
prospective buyers from viewing flats in the new development area. The 
developer claimed the practice did not contravene the law, since those potential 
buyers have signed “no-viewing agreement” and the arrangement did not break 
the law. Besides, the developer also claimed that the project was yet suitable for 
public viewing as the phase-two project was still under construction (SCMP, 19 
July 2014). According to Section 44 of the Ordinance, developers of a newly 
completed project are required to make every flat, or a comparable flat, available 
for viewing by potential buyers. Nevertheless, if a developer is unable to do this, 
it needs to seek written consent from prospective buyers. It was criticized that the 
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developer in this project actually made use of this exemption clause bar 
prospective buyers from viewing the flats on site. 
From the aforementioned examples, it was revealed that even with a smooth 
implementation of the Ordinance, the developers have as far as practicable, been 
trying to make use of the given freedom in the Ordinance and use different tactics 
to optimize their advantages over the property buyers.  
Consumer Council’s findings: fair public satisfaction level towards the 
Ordinance 
After the Ordinance has come into effect, the Consumer Council has in November 
2014 issued a thorough study on the effectiveness of the Ordinance. The study 
was comprised of two parts. One part was related to consumer research including 
conducting a survey of total 602 respondents over the territory between April 
2014 and May 2014, and holding three focus group meetings in late May 2014. 
The second part of the study including field visits which carried out by the 
Council, which involving 17 residential development projects of different scales 
of developments under different property developers in Hong Kong. 
The first part of survey was conducted one year after the promulgation of the 
legislation and aimed to regulate the sales brochures, price list, and relevant 
information to the public. Eventually, the survey result reflected only 43.6% of the 
respondents indicated that the sales brochures which providing property 
information was “average” in the adequacy consideration. 44.5% of the 
respondents considered that insufficient time (i.e. only three days) are given to 
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make price lists available to the public prior to the commencement of sale. The 
aforementioned finding has revealed that public satisfaction level towards the 
Ordinance is fair in general with the expectation of a heightened regulatory 
scrutiny. 
Consumer Council’s findings: contravention of the Ordinance but no 
prosecution 
Though the legislation had put into effect for a year, the study of field visits from 
Consumer Council reviewed that some developers still maintained bad selling 
practices and did not fully comply with the legal requirements. The Council 
checked 17 developments and found that seven of them did not sell all flats listed 
in the price lists issued before the sale. This contravened the provision that 
requiring the lists should include the minimum number of units. This loophole 
results in misleading the potential buyers about the actual supply and leaving 
room for speculation activities. Unofficial promotional materials, which defeat the 
legislative requirement purpose, were still being made available by the developers 
to the perspective purchasers as their alternative sales tactics to boost up their 
comparative sales advantages.  
Besides, some developers also tended to inflate the demand by encouraging 
prospective purchaser to submit multiple registrations of interest. As such, the 
number of registrations might be over several times the actual number of units 
sold, creating a heat atmosphere. The Council found the subscription rates of the 
eight properties checked were from 1.2 times to 22 times of the actual number of 
flats offered for sale in the first batch. In the most extreme case, the developer 
83 
reported 10,000 applications but in fact only 428 flats were available and sold. 
The Council also discovered some of the developers designed a rush sales 
procedure, requiring the buyers to choose a flat within a very short period time, 
say three minutes in some extreme cases. 
Despite these problematic selling practices after the introduction of the Ordinance, 
no agent or developers have been prosecuted for their non-compliance and 
malpractice. The Council thus called for heightened regulatory scrutiny and 
amended the Ordinance. 
Overall significance of the problems 
Judging from the above observation regarding special tactics used by the 
developers and the findings from the Consumer Council in post-Ordinance period, 
it revealed that, though some of the “Problems” identified prior to the enactment 
of the Ordinance had been addressed, there were still problems or immoral 
behaviors of the developers connected with the categories identified by Freiberg. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the problems according to the four categories mentioned by 
Freiberg.  
Figure 5.1 Problems in post-Ordinance period 
Abuse Freedom in sales 
arrangement
Fair public satisfaction level towards the 
Ordinance in Consumer Council’s survey
Abuse the exemption for no 
flat-viewing arrangement 
should “no-viewing 
agreement” be signed 
Public interest Market Failure Risk Management Trust 
Unofficial 
promotional 
materials
Encourage buyers to submit 
multiple registrations of interest 
contravention of the 
Ordinance but no 
prosecution cases
 
Extending the Policy Stream: The Government’s Subsequent Policies on the 
Ordinance – Optimizing or Substituting? 
Overview 
In Chapter 4, a cycle is used to describe the process on how the government 
chooses policy tools through analyzing the relationship between considerations, 
outcome evaluation of tools and situation requiring choice of policy tools (Figure 
4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 Cycle on policy-making process 
Situations requiring the government 
to choose policy arrangement:
• choice of policy tools (substituting); or
• optimizing the existing tools
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e.g. technical viability, costs, 
supports from the public, 
reform possibility
Choice of policy tools: 
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inducements, capacity building, 
System changing
Outcome of the chosen 
policy tools/arrangements
Evaluation
Objective assessment criteria
identified by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge
 
The four policy tools, namely the Consent Scheme, guideline issued by REDA, 
regulatory frameworks by EAA and Consumer Council, which were used prior to 
the Ordinance are evaluated in previous chapter, and it is concluded that the 
government had noted the ineffectiveness of the former policy tools and made 
repeated effort to reform them but in vain. Thus, the government and the various 
political actors considered the reform possibility is minimal and a big bang of 
system changing, i.e. introducing a new legislation and setting up a centralized 
regulatory body, should take place in a very short period of time.  
As an aspect of the policy stream, the legislative process of the Ordinance is 
analyzed to see how a rush and inadequate process affects the outcome and the 
subsequent government decision as to optimizing the policy tool or substituting 
the existing one. 
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Problem of LegCo debate prior to the enactment of the Ordinance: rush and 
inadequate legislative process 
During the legislative process of the Ordinance, the consultation and debate were 
criticized to be inadequate since most of the political stakeholders were rush to 
pass the bill in order to obtain voters and public support within the election year 
of 2012. While this Ordinance is related to sales of first-hand property and there 
are thousands of related legislative requirements to be considered, whether the 
government had taken into consideration of all valuable comments and advices 
from the legal experts? Did the government allocate sufficient period to consult 
the public? Even when the relevant experts were involved, did the government 
have sufficient time and resources to scrutinize the comments and advices from 
the experts and provide timely feedback to further modify the content of the 
Ordinance? Did the government allocate reasonable period to digest and provide 
timely feedback against the received comment irrespective of the tight timeline? 
During the Second Reading debate in LegCo, various LegCo members have aired 
their respective views and concerns as to the unsatisfactory handling process and 
unprofessional of the government. There are different key elements, which have 
been raised up by the LegCo members to point out the deficiency of the 
government during the legislation process. The exact quotes of LegCo Members, 
Ms. Audrey EU and Dr. Margaret NG, during the LegCo debate are highlighted as 
below showing how the rush and tight timeframe during the debate affect the 
outcome of the Ordinance, and the salient point might give some cues against the 
different phenomena observed during the post-Oridance period:- 
87 
Ms. Audrey EU pointed out that it is the usual practice of the Government to table 
a bill at the Legislative Council when it is approaching recess, leaving no time for 
interested parties to express their views and digest the voluminous blue bill. She 
mentioned, “we have held 20 meetings in three months and very often, only Mr. 
CHAN Kam-lam (the chairman of the Bills Committee on the Residential 
Properties (First-hand Sales) Bill) and I attended the meetings. I do not meant to 
accuse other members of being lazy, but merely want to illustrate that many 
Legislative Council committees have to rush through their deliberation. After 
moving into this new LegCo Complex, we have more conference rooms and 
hence several meetings can be held at the same time. Any yet, no members can 
attend two meetings at the same time and sometimes even a division of work 
cannot be achieved. Despite that the clause-by-clause examination of bills requires 
a quorum, a quorum was not present for most of our meetings”. From the above 
quote, it was obvious that the bill is not pass through under thorough 
consideration and discussion by interested parties and LegCo members, it was 
passed through in a rush without the attendance of interested parties and in some 
occasions even the minimum quorum cannot be achieved for most of the 
important meetings. 
Ms. Audrey EU also pointed out that even when the interested parties from public 
were given opportunity to air their views, the government simply gave minimal 
time, or attention to their views. Ms. EU said, “Many members of public have 
been in the LegCo to express views, this including the Law Society of Hong Kong. 
It has provided a submission of 20-odd pages in April, but like any others, its 
speaking time was only three minutes. After submitting the views to the 
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government, it did not respond to the views of the attendants of the hearings until 
it was urged time and again. We had been waiting for so long but the government 
only responded after the clause-by clause examination of the Bill started for some 
time. Having addressed the government’s response, the Law Society noted that 
some of their views were adopted but a lot were not. The Law Society therefore 
conscientiously submitted another submission to the Bills Committee in June, 
stating that the Bill still had many other problems despite that some of its views 
were adopted.” Even after studying the amendments provided by the government 
from the feedback provided by The Law Society, The Law Society finds that there 
are still many essential problems yet to be resolved. 
Even during the course of second reading debate, Ms. EU still received views 
from Law Society, asking Legislative Council Members from the Civic Party to 
pay attention to certain issues. Ms. EU said, “it was too late and no more 
amendments could be proposed as the process was completed. The Law Society 
had no choice but to give letter to the LegCo Secretariat requesting them to pass 
the letter to all members of the Bill Committee.” Ms. EU highlighted that the Bill 
does have deficiencies or omissions but it takes time for the deficiencies or 
omissions to be rectified. 
Dr. Margaret NG pointed out that the government does not have a good 
understanding on the matters about transaction of properties and there is no 
adequate communication and co-operation with the conveyancing personnel of the 
Law Society. She added that “this is evident in its handling of different legislation. 
The reason is probably because the government has focused merely on the 
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protection of consumers’ rights, fraud prevention and penalties, but neglected that 
the inclusion of the relevant provisions into the legislation without adequate 
conveyance expertise may give rise to many problems. As a result of the limited 
time available to consult Law Society, the government had failed to take prompt 
corresponding action after Law Society submitted its various views”. “Today, 
there is neither means nor time for us to add any relevant provisions to the Bill”. 
Dr. NG pointed out that the time for gathering experts comment is very limited. 
Especially for such a complicated Bill which involved high level of legal issues 
which the government have little expertise knowledge on this but spent minimal 
time to address the comment and recommendation from the real experts. Even 
when the government has received comment from the experts, it only responded 
to part of the advice but no time has been given to the experts to further clarify the 
issues. 
During the second reading debate, Dr. NG said, “there are numerous problems 
relating to the arbitrary proper nouns and the imbalance of power between the 
vendors and buyers. This will have serious implication on the solicitors’ work. 
Solicitors usually work with great attention to detail, and this is in great contrast 
to people who are even unaware of the existence of unauthorized structures in 
their house. It is precisely because they are so meticulous in their work that they 
are worried any mistakes in the provisions will lead to litigation. This explains 
why Law Society has written more than 100 paragraphs to set out all the 
deficiencies, and why Ms. EU has said she was unable to elaborate all the 
deficiencies as the submission is really very comprehensive and detailed. I guess 
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LegCo members may not fully understand against the submission while it requires 
a very good understanding of the background and professional knowledge. In fact, 
raising these points at the Committee stage can only achieve very limited effect”.  
From the comments of individual LegCo members above, it is observed that the 
government had, during the legislative process, not given sufficient time to 
meticulously study all received comments and highly complicated legal issues. 
This definitely would affect the outcome of the legislation and its effectiveness, 
which could be objectively assessed through the criteria identified by Baldwin, 
Cave and Lodge and factors suggested by Freiberg. Yet, the evaluation in the case 
also involved how the public and pressure groups perceived and valued the 
Ordinance after it came into effect, which is under the array of political stream. 
Therefore, the political stream as to the administrative dynamics of the Ordinance 
should be first analyzed before a combined evaluation is conducted under these 
two streams.  
The Political Stream: Time to Conduct a Review of the Ordinance? 
According to Kingdon (1995), political stream is made up of public mood, 
pressure group campaigns, election and changes of administration, and these 
components would affect the government in deciding the agendas and the priority 
of policy issues. After the Ordinance comes into effect for two years in 2015, 
there is no significant election or changes of administration, and the dynamics 
under political stream is not strong. Yet, from time to time, different pressure 
groups concerned about the property issues requiring the government to optimize 
the Ordinance.  
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After the enactment of the Ordinance, much had been said and written about the 
effectiveness and actions taken by the SRPA from the political groups/interested 
parties. The Consumer Council conducted a study as to the implementation 
situation of the Ordinance since 2013. Some LegCo members also put follow-up 
enquiries to the government which demonstrated their interest in the effectiveness 
of the Ordinance, ensuring timely actions have been conducting by the 
governance authority during the post-Ordinance period to address the malpractices 
and non-compliances of the developers. 
Consumer Council’s study in November 2014  
Consumer Council is one of the stakeholders, which concerns about the consumer 
protection in the sale of first-hand properties. In November 2014, the Consumer 
Council released a report regarding the first-hand residential properties sales 
situation after the Ordinance has been introduced for 18 months. It was found that 
the situation was disappointing since the poor selling practices including 
withholding units from sales and inflating market response were still discovered.  
In addition to the fair public satisfaction level towards the Ordinance revealed 
from the survey, the Consumer Council called for heightened regulatory scrutiny 
and amended the Ordinance, including the proposal to extend the time period 
between signing the provisional sales and purchase agreement and the formal 
sales and purchase agreement, from 5-7 days to 14 days, and trimmed the forfeit 
amount from 5% to 1-3% of the price, referencing to overseas practices. 
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Follow-up enquiries by LegCo Members 
During the post-Ordinance period, between May 2013 and December 2014, 
LegCo members Mr. Frederick FUNG and Mr. James TO had put up different 
follow-up enquiries for the progress, efficiency, and effectiveness to the STH in 
the Legislative Council meetings respectively. The below are the summary of 
their enquiries. 
Soon after the enactment of the Ordinance, Mr. Frederick FUNG had in May 2013, 
during the LegCo meeting enquiring about the numbers of sales brochures, price 
lists and documents on sales arrangements received by the SRPA. He also 
enquired the number of inspections of the sales offices and show flats of first-hand 
residential properties conducted by the SRPA officers; and if SRPA has unfold 
any contraventions of the Ordinance during the different inspections and checks.  
He also put up questions in the LegCo meetings that if SRPA has received any 
complaints and enquiries about the sales of first-hand residential properties 
regulated under the Ordinance and if any properties agents were being suspected 
of contravening the Ordinance in conveying information on residential 
developments to potential buyers and if SRPA has initiate any investigation into 
the suspicious cases.  
Frederick FUNG also questioned the total quantity of first-hand residential 
developments put up for sale in the market and requested for a comparison 
between the property supply and transaction volume before and after the 
enactment of the Ordinance. During the LegCo meeting Frederick FUNG has 
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been pursuing in how SRPA monitor the progress after the enactment of 
Ordinance. 
After the Ordinance being implemented for 1.5 years, Mr. James TO highlighted 
in the LegCo meeting in December 2014 the study from Consumer Council 
against the Sales of First-hand Residential Properties. The study revealed that 
even after the Ordinance has been enforced for one and a half years, the sales 
process of first-hand residential properties is still bearing various problems 
especially the multiple "registrations of intent" by the same person is allowed 
hence inflating the demand, etc. 
Other than enquiring the different case figures from the SPRA similar to that from 
Mr. Frederick FUNG, Mr. James TO also questioned if the provisions in the 
Ordinance regarding the prohibition of false or misleading information were 
modeled on the relevant provisions in Ordinances such as the Securities and 
Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571). He asked whether SRPA has made reference to the 
experience of prosecutions successfully instituted under the relevant Ordinances, 
with a view to boosting the success rate of the prosecutions concerned. Mr. James 
TO also put up some suggestions including empowering SRPA to seek orders 
from the court to restore the original position, so that for those buyers who have 
suffered losses from the purchase of residential units due to false or misleading 
information may either restore their original positions or receive compensations 
for the better protection of buyers’ benefit. 
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Responses of the Government  
Facing the criticism and requests to amend the Ordinance, the regulatory body 
SPRA reiterated the enforcement works it has done, including examination of 
sales brochures, price lists and other relevant document, complaint investigation, 
inspection, issuing practice notes to the trade and warning letters to violators. For 
the suggestions of review and amendment to the Ordinance, the SPRA opined that 
more experience would be required before conducting a review and should not 
rush in proposing legislative amendment. At the current stage, it would be quicker 
to yield results through discussion between the SPRA and the industry, and the 
issue of guidelines than through legislative amendments (HKSAR Government 
Press Release, 3 December 2014). 
Evaluation of the Ordinance: Policy and Political Streams Combined 
With reference to the issues discussed under Policy and Political Stream, the 
effectiveness of the Ordinance is evaluated by adopting the five criteria identified 
by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) and two important factors suggested by 
Freiberg (2010) set out in Chapter 2, namely legitimacy, efficiency, accountability, 
due process, expertise, effectiveness, and autonomy. 
“Legislative” mandate for imposing legitimate power for regulation  
Under the "Legitimacy" mandate, the regulatory action will gain support when it 
is authorized by Parliament or elected legislature. Following the establishment of 
the Steering Committee, a Bill is drafted and the Ordinance is subsequently 
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enacted via legislative process from LegCo. During the policy making process, the 
Bill was widely supported by the public, property buyers and the political 
stakeholders, except the developers. In the third reading of the Bill, of the 45 
present members, 43 members, including those from pan-democratic camp and 
pro-establishment camp, were in favor of the motion to pass the Bill. While the 
Ordinance was established through legitimate power with the support of a 
majority of the LegCo members, its legitimacy is highly recognized in the society. 
Effectiveness in regulating property developers is in doubt 
To determine whether an activity has met its intended objectives, the 
“Effectiveness” of tools of regulation should be evaluated. However, the 
effectiveness of public actions is always difficult to measure as the achievement 
of individual tool against the designated purpose are always hardly quantify. The 
purposes and objectives of policy could be just an ambiguous goal, making it very 
difficult in setting quantifiable performance indicators.  
In this case, after implementing the Ordinance, different reviews and monitoring 
mechanisms were in place to see if the Ordinance operates smoothly and 
effectively. The Director of SPRA opined that upon the 12 months 
implementation period, the Ordinance was found effective in safeguarding the 
interest of property buyers and the developers have smoothly adapted to the new 
requirements under the Ordinance. Some people saying that the Ordinance is 
effective in governing the developers to provide accurate information to property 
buyers after the Ordinance was in force. Yet, warnings were still been given by 
SPRA from time to time to those developers who have probably contravened the 
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Ordinance during the onset of the implementation period. Consumer Council’s 
study issued in November 2014 also revealed the Ordinance was not effective as 
expected since some bad selling practices were still discovered, and thus a tighten 
regulatory scrutiny was demanded.  
Limited accountability of the regulator 
When considering “Accountability”, the regulator should be held accountable and 
properly controlled by democratic institutions to seek support from the public. 
The regulatory agency might also claim that it is accountable for its interpretation 
of its mandate to a representative body and that this oversight renders its exercise 
of power acceptable.  
In this case, the SPRA under THB should be held accountable if developers were 
found contravening the Ordinance deliberately without proper and strict control. 
After the implementation of the Ordinance, the SPRA has examined hundreds of 
sales brochures, price lists, documents and advertisement. SPRA then concluded 
that most of the vendors have made good efforts to comply with the requirements 
under the Ordinance. For those developers who have possibly contravened the 
Ordinance, remedial actions have been taken by the SPRA in order to alert them 
immediately for rectification.  
The society has yet to see if any sanction system will be effectively enforced 
when any developer committed an offence. Since the implementation of the 
Ordinance, no developer has been prosecuted for their non-compliance. So at this 
stage, the Ordinance is deemed effective but it has yet to fully ascertain whether 
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the SPRA would be held accountable if it failed to pursue the developers under 
legal liability and timely prosecution when opportunities arisen. 
Due process: high involvement of stakeholders in the policy process 
Regarding to “Due Process”, the focus is whether the procedures in the Ordinance 
are sufficiently fair, accessible, and open, and allows the public (e.g. property 
buyers in this case) and particularly the affected parties (i.e. the developers) to 
participate in the regulatory decision and policy process (Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge, 2012, p. 29).  
Based on the Steering Committee’s recommendation, THB has prepared a draft 
legislation attached to the Consultation Paper on the Proposed Legislation to 
Regulate the Sale of First-hand Properties, which was released in November 2011 
for a two-month consultation. Looking at the membership of the Steering 
Committee, it is chaired by the Permanent Secretary for Transport and Housing 
(Housing) and comprised the representatives from various affected parties, 
including representatives of the Consumer Council, EAA, REDA, Law Society of 
Hong Kong and Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors. The policy making process are 
highly accessible and transparent, and the level of participation of different 
stakeholders can be regarded as high.  
Insufficiency of legal expertise 
Under the perspective of ”Expertise”, it stipulated that the specific rules and 
regulations require the exercise of expert judgment as the regulators have to 
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consider a number of factors and variables, which specialized knowledge and 
expertise, are required.  
In this case, the comments from the Law Society, accordingly to the content of 
LegCo debate raised by Dr. Margaret NG and Ms. Audrey EU, was found not 
being fully considered and timely addressed. The very limited time given in the 
consideration of experts’ comment might be subject to the lack of expertise and 
understanding of the complicated legal issues in the Ordinance which resulting in 
the very late and over simplified response to the legal expert. On the other hand, it 
cannot rule out the possibility that the lack of professional response to the legal 
expert might be simply because the government rushing to pass the Ordinance so 
is hesitated to go back into detail study whenever new problems were identified 
by the Law Society.  
Seeing the above finding, this could on certain extent to explain why after the 
implementation the developers could still identify different loopholes to further 
develop their corresponding sale tactics to find gap pursuing the sales advantages 
over the potential buyers. As mentioned by Dr. Margaret NG, over 100 paragraphs 
of essential comment from the Law Society is ignored and the Ordinance simply 
passing through in a rush leaving no time to seriously address those essential areas 
highlighted by the legal experts on different separate occasions.  
For the management of the SPRA, it is headed and managed by a senior 
Administrative Officer Grade staff with the assistance of a group of professional 
surveyors from various government departments involving in lands and building 
matters. Yet, as mentioned above, the issues under the Ordinance is highly 
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complicated. Employing external legal experts or establishing independent 
committees with independent members, which is similar to the practice of other 
regulatory bodies like the EAA, may be considered to enhance the expertise 
aspect of the SPRA.  
Efficiency for the cost of regulation 
As regards “Efficiency”, the level of input could measure whether the legislative 
mandate is being implemented efficiently, or the costs compared to the outputs 
achieved. In this case, the SPRA has been overseeing the developers’ behavior 
and been determining whether the developers’ tactics are complied with the 
Ordinance. When the developers’ tactics are found possibly to be contravened the 
Ordinance via the loopholes they identified, warnings will be given to take 
remedial actions for rectification.  
The SPRA is small in size and is attached under the THB. Currently the staff of 
SPRA are mostly civil servants. This arrangement can reduce the cost involved in 
setting up a new public organization at the beginning. The cost seemed to be 
maintained at a reasonable level. Yet, whether a productive efficiency could be 
resulted? 
Developers’ acts were being monitored by the SPRA from time to time, the 
sanction system was found somewhat too loose with no deterrent effect. During 
the implementation stage, lots of warnings had been given but it seldom finds any 
developers bearing the legal consequences and subject to prosecution for their 
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post implementation sale tactics which are being considered not desirable by the 
SPRA. 
During the implementation stage of the Ordinance, some developers might still 
take the chance to identify special sale tactics to maximize their sales advantage 
without fully complying with the Ordinance. The Ordinance could be 
implemented under a more efficiency way should the SPRA adopts a more 
stringent control and a zero-tolerant enforcement strategy through active 
monitoring the developers’ behavior. 
High autonomy of the SPRA 
“Autonomy” is specific in some industries especially when the independency of 
tools of regulation is important to the application of tools. Some regulatory tools 
are required to be autonomous so that it will not be easily affected by external 
force or environment, no matter how much pressure are given by the public or 
relevant stakeholders. In this case, the SPRA possesses high autonomy as it is 
generated by legislative process with unanimously supports from the stakeholder 
with high independency, when compared with the previous self-regulatory regime 
of the REDA. The governance, execution and enforcement of the SPRA would 
not be affected easily by the external force or environment. It is further suggested 
that the SPRA could be separated from the governmental structure, so as to further 
enhance its independency and autonomy.  
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Overall significance 
In accordance with the criteria by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, it can be concluded 
that the Ordinance is still an effective tool to monitor the sale of first-hand 
residential properties, though the assessment results in some areas are not as 
satisfactory as it expected. It is good to see that the Ordinance could meet the 
standard under legitimacy, due process and autonomy.  
For the aspects of effectiveness, accountability, expertise and efficiency, although 
the Ordinance has made good progress, there are rooms for improvement. 
Enhancement on these aspects could be made for better monitoring the sale of 
first-hand residential properties. In view of the above evaluation result, the 
government at this stage could opt to optimize this policy tool and there is no need 
to choose other alternative tools to deal with this issue.  
Concluding Remarks 
Kingdon’s three-stream theory is adopted to find out if there are dynamics for 
policy change after the implementation of the Ordinance. It is true that the 
problems appeared prior to the Ordinance are dealt with through the requirements 
stipulated in the legislation. Yet, from the perspective of problem stream, there are 
a number of problems still existed due to the abuse of the freedoms given for 
business flexibility under the Ordinance. As for policy stream, though the 
Ordinance is implementing under good progress and found running smoothly and 
effectively enhancing the transparency and fairness of the sale of first-hand 
property, the initial rush legislative process has led to the Ordinance formulated 
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with ambiguous areas which affects its effectiveness. There are rooms for 
improvement in various aspects in accordance with the criteria set out by Baldwin, 
Cave and Lodge as well as Freiberg. For political stream, the public mood 
towards the Ordinance is still positive though there are some pressure groups 
requesting to review the Ordinance and heighten regulatory scrutiny. Overall 
speaking, the policy dynamic in the post-Ordinance period is not making a new 
choice on the policy tools, but optimizing the regulatory framework under the 
SPRA.  
In the next chapter, improvement measures to the Ordinance and the SPRA, with 
reference to the overseas experience, will be discussed and recommended.  
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CHAPTER 6 - SELECTED OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE, 
RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS  
Introduction 
This project analyzes the policy making and administration processes in the 
regulatory framework on the sale of first-hand residential properties in Hong 
Kong. Kingdon’s three-stream model (1995) is used to analyze the situation in 
different timeline in Hong Kong. The decision to buy a residential property in 
Hong Kong is very prominent to the people in Hong Kong as it involves the 
investment of most people’s life long earnings. However, due to the unequal 
bargaining power between the property developers and the purchasers and the 
inadequacy of the policy tools in force, some noticeable problems in relation to 
the sale of first-hand residential properties in Hong Kong emerged. As analyzed 
through Freiberg (2010)’s theory, the harm on public interest, failure of market, 
management of risk and distrust triggered the call for a change of the condition.  
With reference to Chapter 4, a mix of policy tools under different types of 
governance (Knill & Tosun, 2012) has been in place in Hong Kong, including the 
Consent Scheme, guidelines issued by REDA, regulatory frameworks by the EAA 
and the Consumer Council in the pre-Ordinance period. They are largely mandate 
and capacity building (Elmore, 1987) in nature. Assessed with the seven 
evaluation criteria set by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) and Freiberg (2010), 
the policy tools in the pre-Ordinance period are found to be in deficiency. Though 
the government intended to alleviate the situation by putting in force different 
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policy tools, the governance mode during the pre-Ordinance period was largely 
relied on the self-discipline of the developers in providing accurate information to 
the potential buyers in the sales market. The government had yet to demonstrate 
the determination and effectively adopt corresponding measures to mitigate the 
problem of providing inaccurate property information, misleading property 
location, skipping unfavorable details in the sales brochure, misleading sales 
information regarding the completed transactions, unfair sales arrangement, etc. 
by the private developers.  
Coupling with the political atmosphere, the Residential Properties (First-hand 
Sales) Ordinance was promulgated in 2012 to break the predicament. This latest 
policy was analysed with the three-stream model and evaluated with the 
abovementioned seven criteria. Still, problems on the sales of first-hand 
residential property were reported. The Hong Kong Consumer Council has 
published a study on the sales of first-hand residential property in November 2014 
in which some observations on the inadequacies of Ordinance, namely confusing 
voluminous information and dubious sales practices, lending to prospective 
purchasers, aggressive on-site selling are recognized. Nevertheless, the political 
context at the moment does not warrant a policy change. Improvement on the 
aspects of effectiveness, accountability, expertise and efficiency is expected.  
Other than looking into the situation in Hong Kong, selected overseas experience 
in regulating the sales of first-hand property is studied. As the demographic 
profile, social and economic backgrounds of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan 
are considered to be in similar characteristics, the regulatory framework of 
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Singapore and Taiwan are selected for reference to see if any more effective 
measures worth being considered under Hong Kong context. It is perceived that 
policy tools exercised by Singapore and Taiwan could serve as reflection and 
inspire Hong Kong Government on possible alternative solutions. 
Singapore and Taiwan: Stringent Regulatory Requirements and Wider 
Protection for Prospective Purchasers 
Policy tools employed 
Both in Singapore and Taiwan, there are statutory regulations governing the sale 
of first-hand residential properties. Some of the regulations are explicitly for the 
sale of first-hand residential properties while some are general regulations on 
consumer protection. Applying Elmore’s theory, both Singapore and Taiwan 
adopt mandate as authoritative rules or prescriptions governing the behavior of 
individuals and agencies. The regulations in place are briefly described below. 
The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) is the land use planning and 
conservation authority in Singapore. Among its multiples duties, it aims at 
improving transparency in property market by providing comprehensive and 
timely real estate information to assist home-buyers, developers and investors to 
make informed decisions. It also protects home-buyers by ensuring fair contract 
terms, and ensuring that developers provide adequate information to home-buyers 
so that they can make informed decisions before committing to a property 
purchase. As the regulator of private housing development in the country, it enacts 
its responsibilities mainly through the Housing Developers (Control and 
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Licensing) Act (HDCLA), Housing Developers Rules (HDR), Residential 
Property Act (PRA) and the Development Control Parameters Handbook on Gross 
Floor Area (2011) (DCPH-GFA).  
In Taiwan, Fair Trade Commission (FTC) and Consumer Protection Commission 
(CPC) are two main authorities responsible for regulations relating to the sale of 
first-hand residential properties. FTC is the central competent authority in charge 
of competition policy and Fair Trade Act in Taiwan. It is charged with drafting 
fair trade policy, laws, regulations, and investigating and handling various 
activities impeding competition, such as monopolies, mergers, concerted actions, 
and other restraints on competition or unfair trade practices on the part of 
enterprises. FTC regulates the sales of properties via two main directions, namely 
Disposal Directions (Guidelines) on Cases of Real Estate in Advertising (DDG) 
and Disposal Directions (Policy Statements) on Selling Presale Houses (DDPS). 
On the other hand, CPC is responsible for consultation, discussion, and review of 
important consumer protection policies, laws and regulations, mechanism, and 
enforcement outcomes, as well as cross-agency coordination. CPC issued standard 
contract templates and circulars to protect consumer interests in purchasing 
properties. In addition, the Real Estate Transaction Information Reporting and 
Pricing Enquiry Regulation (RETIRPER) is also relevant to sales of properties. 
The standard contract templates and circulars for real estate transactions published 
by CPC include the followings: 
1. Standardized Contract Template Regarding Pre-sale Housing (SCPSH) 
2. Circular Regarding Information be Included and Not Be Included in The 
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Standardized Contract of Pre-sale Housing (Circular – SCPSH) 
3. Standardized Contract Template Regarding Existing Housing (SCEH) 
4. Circular Regarding Information be Included and Not Be Included in The 
Standardized Contract of Existing Housing (Circular – SCEH) 
In addition, the URA educates the developers and public through its homepage 
and publications. They provide useful information both to the developers and 
prospective purchasers by publishing Guidelines in the homepage, e.g. the Home 
Buyer’s Guide, which aims at providing basic information on the process of 
buying residential properties, and key considerations the purchasers have to be 
aware before completing the purchase. It also regularly releases publications on 
real estate reporting latest statistics on prices and rentals, available and vacant units, 
and development projects in the pipeline in the private residential sector. Similarly, 
the homepage of FTC and CPC provide the developers and the prospective 
purchasers the information in relation to the sales of residential property and 
educate the public through its report, e.g. the Empirical Analysis of Fair Trade 
Commission Actions Regarding Real Estate Transactions: case studies from 
January 1, 2001 to March 31, 2014 which analyze the property transaction 
punishment cases and the type of violation by the developers or brokerage firms. 
According to Elmore (1987), capacity building is the investment of various kinds 
for strengthening endowments, which may include material, intellectual, and 
human resources. Under this classification, both Singapore and Taiwan has 
adopted policy tools in term of mandate and capacity building.  
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In the context of Hong Kong, Figure 4.2 has identified the policy tools utilized in 
the pre-Ordnance period. In the post-Ordinance, the SRPA was set up to ensure 
the Ordinance is implemented effectively. Other than the duties of administering 
and supervising compliance with the provisions of the Ordinance, it is responsible 
for educating the public on matters relating to the sales of first-hand residential 
properties and organizing publicity programmes. The policy tools in force of the 
three jurisdictions are summarized in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Policy Tools use in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan 
Jurisdiction Policy Tools Elmore’s classification 
Lands Department’s Consent Scheme Mandate 
Real Estate Developers Association of 
Hong Kong (REDA) Mandate 
Estate Agents Authority (EAA) Mandate and Capacity Building 
Consumer Council Mandate 
Hong Kong 
Sales of First-hand Residential Properties 
Authority (SRPA) 
Mandate and 
Capacity Building 
Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) Mandate and Capacity Building 
Fair Trade Commission (FTC) Mandate and Capacity Building Taiwan 
Consumer Protection Commission (CPC) Mandate and Capacity Building 
In the ensuing paragraphs, the situations in Singapore and Taiwan will be 
examined in terms of property information, sales information, sales arrangements, 
and after sales protection.  
Property information 
(a) Singapore. As stipulated in Form 3 of the HDR, the developers in Singapore 
have the obligation to provide the purchasers the particulars, documents and 
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information of the property before issue of option to purchase. It covers the 
address of the property, the estimated land area of the property, the location plan 
of the property showing nearby buildings, facilities and other features in the 
vicinity within a radius of 500 meters. If the property is going to be comprised a 
lot in a strata title plan, the estimated total floor area of the property and the 
description of all floors space for different uses and other spaces have to be listed 
one in a standardized format. 
In respect of the floor area measurements, Singapore uses square meter as the 
measuring unit. According to “The Development Control Parameters Handbook 
on Gross Floor Area”, “All covered floor areas of a building, except otherwise 
exempted, and uncovered areas for commercial use are deemed the gross floor 
area of the building for purposes of plot ratio control and development charge. 
The gross floor area is the total area of the covered floor space measured between 
the centre line of party walls, including the thickness of external walls but 
excluding voids. Accessibility and usability are not criteria for exclusion from 
gross floor area”. In addition, gross floor area covers balconies, bay windows, 
bicycle, car parks, household shelters, lift motor room, outdoor refreshment areas, 
etc., but excludes lift shafts, main entrance, etc. 
With reference to section 14 of the Agreement of Sale and Purchase under the 
HDR, in case there is any substitution or use of cheaper materials or an omission 
of any works or a reduction in the scale of work, the purchasers are entitled to 
have a reduction in the purchase price. Though the purchasers do not have the 
right to invalidate the Agreement of Sale and Purchase if there is any error, 
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omission or misdescription on the area of the property, the purchasers can claim 
for reduction under section 18 at the rate of the Unit Purchase Price for every 
square meter when the deficiency is in excess of 3% of the area stated in the 
Agreement. 
Singapore has also exercised its control on property advertisement of any housing 
project on what particulars should be included and what is prohibited through 
Rule 3 & 6 of HDR.  
Mandatory particulars include: 
 name and license number of the developer; 
 tenure of the land and encumbrances; 
 expected date when the purchasers can take possession of the units; 
 expected date of legal title of the units to be conveyed to the purchasers; and 
 location of the property, containing lot number and Mukim/Town 
Subdivision. 
Prohibited particulars include anything, which suggests or is calculated to suggest: 
 the patronage of the President or of any of the members of his family; 
 any connection with any Government department, statutory body or public 
building or place; or 
 any attribute to which the housing developer cannot genuinely make a claim. 
Rule 7 also sets out the prohibition from advertising false or misleading statement 
or information in relation to a housing project or any failure to comply with Rule 
3 & 6 on particulars to be included and prohibited. 
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 (b) Taiwan.  As stated in the preamble of the DDPS on Selling Presale Houses, 
owing to the very limited information available to the purchasers on the presale 
house at the time of singing the purchase contract, the purchasers can only rely on 
advertisement or the purchase contract for information of the environment, lay-out, 
facilities, building materials, etc for concluding the decision to purchase. In this 
connection, the DDPS is promulgated to enhance the transparency of real estate 
trade. Under the DDPS, the developer has to disclose important information to the 
purchasers, including a copy of construction license, cadastral map of proposed 
site, overview of proportionate share distribution per unit (sufficient to indicate 
main structure, auxiliary structures, area of common space, and proportionate ratio 
of common space); detailed listing of commonly held items, area, and calculation 
of proportionate share distribution, expenses on legally mandatory land 
readjustment or restrictive information concerning land readjustment. Before 
requesting deposit or singing the sales contract, all this information has to be read, 
and acknowledged by the prospective purchasers with sufficient time provided, at 
least five days are required. 
The developers are required to state the total property area in the contract for both 
pre-sale and existing houses. With regard to the pre-sale houses, the developers 
are required to provide additional information, including the details on the area of 
common-use portions, ancillary building area, etc. “Privately Owned Area” is a 
legislative requirement for all residential properties. It refers to the sum of Interior 
Usable Area, Public Facility Area and Subsidiary Area. 
112 
For pre-sale houses, purchasers could claim for compensation if there is 
deficiency of floor area between the offer and the contract as protected under 
SCPSH. The deficiency would be compensated in monetary value. In case the 
deficiency is more than 3%, termination of contract is allowed. On the other hand, 
if the area of the completed house is larger than the contact, the developers could 
claim for a maximum 2% of the purchase price from purchasers. 
Regarding regulations on advertisements, FTC sets out DDG to maintain trading 
order and protect the purchaser’s rights and interests by preventing the real estate 
developers from using improper advertisement to mislead the purchasers in 
executing unfair property transactions. A real estate advertisement should not 
contain the any descriptions of untrue, false or misleading representations about 
building location, real estate area, the appearance, design, and layout (commonly 
owned or common-use portions) of a building, building materials and equipment, 
commonly-owned public facilities, building surroundings, view and landscape, 
parking space, etc. For a number of items above, the standards of violation is 
determined by the discrepancy at the degree unacceptable to the general public. In 
addition, there is restriction on the use of words, statutory language should be 
used as the representation of building area, such as "building area," "base area," 
"main building area," "ancillary building area," or "area of common-use portions" 
with area size represented different from the rightful area under such statutory 
language or with the registered area, and violation of the discrepancy is also at the 
degree unacceptable to the general public. The developers will be prosecuted 
under the Fair Trade Act for any violations of these guidelines. 
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Sales information 
(a) Singapore. For prospective purchasers in Singapore, they will be informed of 
the detailed information of the property before paying booking fee. Developers 
are also required to maintain a Register of Bookings for the inspection of URA 
upon request. The standard format of the register is depicted in Form 1 in the 
Schedule of HDR, which covers details of purchasers and properties, purchasing 
prices and option fees (i.e. deposit) etc. To provide prospective purchasers with 
latest market information, the Singapore Government has set up a web-based 
platform for the upload of transaction price within the period of the recent 36 
months. Only purchase with caveat lodged will be uploaded on this platform. 
(b) Taiwan. Ministry of Interior has set out the RETIRPER to enhance the 
transparency of property transaction information. Under the arrangement, 
transaction information, such as price, size, location and transaction date of the 
property has to be reported within 30 days of the transaction. Such information 
will be open for public access at the designated webpage. 
Sales arrangements 
(a) Singapore. According to the Guidelines and procedures set by URA, the 
intending purchaser in Singapore has an option to purchase the property, which is 
a right or option given by the developer of a property to buy the property. All 
licensed developers have to use standard option to purchase form to sell a property. 
The said form states the price and other details of the property. To be entitled of 
the option, the purchaser has to pay a booking fee, which is ranged 5% to 10% of 
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purchase price of the residential property. The option is non-assignable. Therefore, 
all persons intended to purchase have to be named in the option to purchase in 
order to be eligible to exercise the option and sign the Sales and Purchase 
Agreement for the property as purchasers. 
The developer is then required to send the Sale & Purchase Agreement and the 
original or copies of the title deeds no later than 14 days from the date of the 
option. The purchaser has to make the decision on whether to exercise the option 
within three weeks from the date of delivery. If the purchaser chooses not to 
exercise the option, 25% of the booking fee will be forfeited by the developer. 
Under the HDR, the Sale & Purchase Agreement is a standardized form, which 
specifies the purchase price, payment schedule and all other terms and conditions 
of property sales in Singapore. 
(b) Taiwan. Two standard contract templates, SCPSH and SCEH are published by 
CPC for property transaction. For pre-sale houses, the former contract is used. It 
states the conditions, which the purchasers are entitled to terminate the contract if 
insufficient mortgage is granted. Depending on cause of the insufficiency and the 
extent of difference between mortgage and purchase price, different rules apply. If 
it is not caused by the developer or the purchaser, the developer may choose to 
lend the shortfall to the purchaser or terminate the contract. If it is attributed to 
either party, the developer has to lend the deficiency to the purchaser or the 
purchaser to settle the difference within 30 days. For existing houses, similar 
clauses are stated in the SCEH.  
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As mentioned in earlier paragraphs, detailed property information has to be read, 
acknowledged by the prospective purchasers prior at least five days before 
acceptance of any deposit or signage of any contract. This requirement has been 
stipulated in both Circular – SCPSH and Circular – SCEH. There is no other 
cooling-off period set in the regulation or circulars. 
After sales protection 
(a) Singapore. After completion of sales, the developer is required under clause 
13 of the HDR to deliver the property to the purchaser no later than the vacant 
possession date stated in the Sale & Purchase Agreement and no later than 21 
days starting from the date of receipt of payment of 25% of the purchase price 
from the purchaser. The purchaser is entitled to claim liquidated damages if the 
developer fails to deliver vacant possession of the property within the two dates 
mentioned above. The damages are to be calculated on a daily basis at the rate of 
10% per annum on the total sum of all the installments paid by the purchaser 
towards the purchase price, and are payable commencing on the start date until 
vacant possession of the property is given to the purchaser. However, the 
developer is not liable to the damages if (i) the purchaser requests for or agrees to 
the delivery of vacant possession of the property to him at a later date; or (ii) for 
any reason for which the developer is not responsible, the purchaser does not take 
delivery of vacant possession of the property until a later date. 
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Under clause 17 of the HDR, the developer is liable for any defect in the property 
for 12 months from the date the vacant possession of the property is delivered to 
the purchaser or the 15th day after the purchaser receives the notice that 
Temporary Occupation Permit is issued or the roads, drainage and sewerage 
works serving the housing project have been completed.  
(b) Taiwan.  For pre-sale houses, the developer shall complete the sale and 
transfer the property to the purchaser within six months of obtaining “Building 
Use Permit” (BUP). If not, the purchaser will be fined 0.05% of purchase price 
daily. If the building works do not start according to the date set out in the 
contract, the purchaser is subject to a daily penalty of 0.05% of purchase price. If 
the works is not started after three months of the pre-set date, the purchaser could 
terminate the contract. For existing houses, the date of transaction is agreed 
between the developer and purchasers, and included as contractual term in SCEG. 
Similarly, if there is any delay caused by the developer, the purchaser is entitled 
for a daily compensation of 0.05% of purchase price. 
For pre-sale house, as required by SCPSH, developer has to list out the warranty 
information in details, including the warranty period and types of defects covered 
in a House Warranty Card. Under the law, structural defects are warranted for 15 
years while other building materials and facilities are entitled for warrant for only 
one year. For existing house, the defects liability period is not specified. Any 
defect should be reported to the developers immediately for rectification. 
Nevertheless, a maximum of five years warranty period is provided after vacant 
possession.  
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Recommendations 
Inspirations from the overseas experience 
From the study above, it is observed that Singapore has implemented the most 
stringent regulatory framework in regulating the sales of first-hand residential 
property. The HDR has stipulated the regulation in respect of the property and 
sales information in details. Unlike Hong Kong, which requires name of street, 
building and other facility within 250 meters of the boundary of the development 
to be listed out in the sales brochures, HDR in Singapore requires any such 
information to be provided within a radius of 500 meters which allows the 
purchaser to have a better understanding on the environment nearby and aware of 
any misrepresentation by real estate agents. In order to protect the purchasers from 
being misled by improper advertisement to execute unfair property transaction, 
the HDR states clearly what kind of information is allowed and prohibited in the 
advertisements. With regards to the area of the property, Taiwan allows the 
purchasers to invalidate the contract of purchase if the deficiency is greater than 
3%.  
In respect of consumer protection, Singapore and Taiwan are considered to 
provide a broader coverage to the prospective purchasers. In the area of sales 
arrangement, booking fee of 5% to 10% of the purchase price is required to entitle 
the option to purchase in Singapore, which is similar to the 5% deposit 
requirement in Hong Kong. However, upon forgoing the option, only 25% of the 
booking fee will be forfeited. In other words, the penalty is only one-fourth of that 
in Hong Kong. Not only the forfeitable amount is much lower than Hong Kong, 
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the prospective purchasers enjoy three weeks period to consider exercising the 
option to purchase or not which is more than three-fold of the five working days 
arrangement in Hong Kong. In Taiwan, the purchaser is protected against the 
possibility of insufficient mortgage granted. In such case, the purchaser is entitled 
to terminate the contract. If there is late delivery of vacant possession, the 
purchaser in Singapore is entitled to claim damages based on the total sum of all 
the instalments paid while that in Taiwan is 0.05% of purchaser price per day. 
Regarding the general defect liability, it is only valid for six months after the 
completion of sale and purchase in Hong Kong while that in Singapore and 
Taiwan is at least 12 months. For structural defects, the warranty even lasts for 15 
years in Taiwan. 
The Residential Properties (First-hand Sales) Ordinance is promulgated to 
regulate different aspects on the sales of first-hand residential property. However, 
too many freedoms are given to the developers to exercise their rights in making 
business decisions that they have made use of the exemption clauses, grey areas or 
even potential loopholes to heighten their bargaining power/position during the 
sales of the residential properties so as to achieve maximum benefits. The 
existence of information asymmetry, the ineffectiveness of the Ordinance and 
insufficient trust established lead to the persistence of the problems. Coupling 
with the analysis in previous chapters and taking the experience from Singapore 
and Taiwan, the inadequacies identified in respect of the Ordinance and the role of 
SRPA as assessed by the evaluation criteria set by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 
(2012) and Friedberg (2010) may be improved. It is recommended the following 
119 
measures can be taken to strengthen the existing Ordinance, enhance the 
monitoring role of EAA and SPRA, and educate the stakeholders. 
Strengthen the existing Ordinance 
The Ordinance could be strengthened to supplement the shortfall in the area of 
property information, sales information, sales arrangement and after sales 
protection. It is understood that SRPA tries to strike a balance between enhancing 
the transparency and fairness in the sales of first-hand residential properties, and 
providing vendors with the flexibility in making business decisions and disposing 
of their properties lawfully. However, some "tricky" sales information or sales 
arrangement should be avoided. As aware by SRPA (Press release issued on 29 
April 2014), developers have made use of different sales sessions to "freeze" the 
sales information available to the prospective purchasers that they have to make 
decision based on limited information or by offering a lower price for a property 
as promotional strategy but then offer an increased price afterwards. Besides, 
according to the survey conducted by the Consumer Council in 2014, about 43.6% 
of the survey respondents said the extent of adequacy of sales brochures in 
providing property information is only "average" and 44.5% of the respondents 
considered the availability of the price list three days in advance the 
commencement of sale is insufficient. The field visit conducted by the Consumer 
Council found that the price lists were frequently revised and the information on 
register for transactions was not readily available by the time of sale. The 
purchasers were also observed to be pressurized by the sales representatives to 
make cursory decisions when purchase. 
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It is recommended requiring the developers to adopt sales practice modelling on 
the current sales arrangement of HOS Flats by the Hong Kong Housing Authority. 
First of all, the balloting sessions and the flat selection sessions should be fixed on 
separate dates so that the purchasers do not need to make rush decisions within the 
same day. In addition, the details of the flats available for sale should be made 
known to the prospective purchasers at the spot with immediate updated 
information. Having selected a HOS flat, the prospective purchaser is allowed to 
make appointment to view the selected flat prior to the signing of the Agreement 
for Sale and Purchase on the next working day at the latest. By doing so, the 
prospective purchaser would have enough time to consider and to make the right 
choice. With the assistance of information technology, the developers should also 
prepare a list of flats available for sale with instant update at the sales office on a 
digital panel as well as in the SPRA designated website, so that most of the 
prospective purchasers will not be confused by the "tricky" sales arrangement.  
Though Singapore has the most stringent regulations in force on the sale of first-
hand residential property, it is not necessary for Hong Kong to copy the relevant 
regulation in full. Hong Kong has been at the top of the economic freedom 
ranking, too much intervention on the trade market is not viable. Nevertheless, 
balance has to be achieved between free market and consumer protection. Crucial 
areas which can have substantial impact on prospective purchasers could be 
adopted. Considering the substantial value involved in property transaction and 
referencing on overseas experience, SPRA may consider extending the cooling 
period from five working days to a longer period, say 14 to 21 days and lowering 
the amount of forfeiture from 5% of the purchase price to a more acceptable range. 
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To provide a wider coverage of protection to the prospective purchasers, it is 
recommended to extend the defects liability period to at least 12 months to fit with 
the standard in Singapore and Taiwan.  
Enhance the monitoring role of the EAA and SPRA 
The type of policy tools employed in regulating the sales of first-hand properties 
is mainly mandate which is authoritative rules in governing the behaviour of 
individuals and agencies. However, the property information required to be 
included in the sales brochures is found incomplete in some occasions. 
Nevertheless, as identified in many news reports and the field visits conducted by 
the Consumer Council, some estate agents supplied unofficial publicity materials 
or offered loans to prospective purchasers while promoting a first-hand residential 
property, the practice is in fact violates the EAA’s guidelines. To combat these 
commonly observed misbehaviours, the EAA and SRPA should consider 
conducting more frequent on-site inspections at sales offices and show flats.  
Furthermore, measures should also be taken to remove the doubt on the 
accountability of SPRA arising from the query on why there are suspected 
contraventions of the Ordinance by the developers but no prosecution has been 
taken. The investigation should be made transparent with periodic progress report 
publicized so as to rebuild trust from the public. Full investigations on the 
suspected contraventions should be conducted as early as possible. For suspected 
cases failing to proceed subsequent prosecution, the SPRA should consider 
publishing case summary or highlights for the public, as far as practicable.  
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Monitoring role could be further enhanced if the management of SPRA can be 
strengthened with more legal expert. Employing contractual legal experts to assist 
in complicated case is one of the options. Another option is to establish standing 
committees with independent members of legal background, which are appointed 
by the government. Such practice is similar to those in other regulatory bodies like 
the EAA. The external impartial members could provide their valuable legal 
expertise, thereby helping to monitor the first-hand residential property market 
effectively.  
Currently the SPRA is operated as statutory body with all civil servants staff. It is 
suggested that, in order to further enhance its autonomy, the SPRA should be 
separated from the governmental structure and has independent autonomy in staff 
employment and independent financial source like other regulatory bodies, such 
as EAA, Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong, Independent 
Commission Against Corruption and Independent Police Complaints Council, so 
as to further enhance its independency and autonomy. 
Educate the stakeholders 
According to the Consumer Council Report, it showed the public only have fair 
level of awareness of the existence of the SRPA. Further, for those who were 
actually aware of the SRPA existence had little idea about its functions. Other 
than solving the problem through mandate or authoritative rules, building the 
knowledge base of the public is another effective way, though it takes a longer 
period of time to evaluate the effectiveness. As SRPA is the sole body tasked to 
implement the Ordinance, its existence and functions should be promoted in wider 
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context to enhance the overall awareness of the general public so that the 
information relating to the first-hand property sales, e.g. the Ordinance and other 
relevant important information could be directed to the prospective purchasers 
reminder their right throughout the whole process of the sales transaction. Similar 
to the URA in Singapore, the webpage of SRPA provides crucial information to 
the prospective purchasers in a user-friendly format. Through enhancing the 
publicity of the SRPA in different occasions, like advertisements in mass media 
and sales office, the prospective purchasers could be safeguarded from making 
rush and premature decision in property sales. The SRPA and EAA should 
consider jointly organize ethical and practical seminars to the frontline sales 
agents of residential property under mandatory basis to ensure their thorough 
understand of the Ordinance and possible legal consequence in adopting improper 
sales practice. 
The abovementioned recommendations are assessed by the seven evaluation 
criteria on policy tools and summarized in figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2 Impact of the suggested enhancement measures 
Criteria Changes caused by the enhancement Impact 
Legislative  Administrative measures without involvement of amendment of the Ordinance No change 
Effectiveness 
 Stringent compliance check 
 Improve sales arrangement 
 Up-to-date sales information available at the spot 
Enhanced 
Accountability 
 Full investigation on the suspected cases as early as 
possible 
 Investigation progress report and case report 
highlight periodically publicize 
Enhanced 
Due process 
 Opinions from the prospective purchasers collected 
through the survey conducted by Consumer Council 
 Participation of another stakeholder - Consumer 
Council 
 Enhance transparency on disclosure of information 
Enhanced 
Legal Expertise 
 Employ contractual legal experts in complicated 
cases 
 Establish standing committees with independent 
members of legal background appointed by the 
government.  
Enhanced 
Efficiency 
 Setting up of new sales arrangement system which 
allow efficient dissemination of information 
 Enhance the knowledge of the stakeholders in the 
first-hand residential property market through 
education 
Enhanced 
Flexibility/Autonomy  SRPA to operate as an the independent statutory body with its own staff but not civil servants Enhanced 
 
Conclusions 
The project began with a review of the housing history of Hong Kong. Housing 
demand has increased since the 1970s when massive population rushed into Hong 
Kong. Due to land scarcity, housing-related issues become the major, if not the 
first and foremost, concern in the government policy agenda. Through studying 
the development of Hong Kong housing policy with the governance models by 
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Knill & Tosun, it is found that the government played a more and more active role 
in housing-related issues, from private self-governance to interventionist 
governance, as Hong Kong developed in recent decades.  
The objectives of this project are to understand the policy making and 
administrative processes as well as the dynamics to change the tools in monitoring 
the sale of first-hand residential properties, which is one of the important scopes 
in Hong Kong housing-related policy. For many years, public has criticized that 
the first-hand residential property market was rift with developers’ malpractices. 
The government, in response to the public concern, had applied multi-pronged 
approach with four major policy tools, namely the Consent Scheme, guideline 
issued by REDA, regulatory frameworks by the EAA and the Consumer Council, 
to tackle the situation. This project examined these tools according to analytical 
framework set out in Chapter 2. Integrating Kingdon’s problem stream with 
Freiberg’s classification of fostering factors, a clearer picture on the “why” 
elements that drive the policy change appeared. The project matched the policy 
stream prior to the set up of Ordinance with a policy-making cycle model (Figure 
4.3). developed in this project. Apart from analyzing the consideration process in 
choosing the tools with Elmore’s classification, the cycle also associated with the 
evaluation criteria identified by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge as well as Freiberg to 
illustrate how the outcome of the chosen policy tools will affect the government 
decision on policy arrangement and create the situation requiring the government 
to make choice on policy tools. It is concluded that, together with the political 
stream influenced by those factors like public mood and administration change, a 
big bang system changing in policy tools would be resulted.  
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To further apply the policy and administrative dynamics theory in reality, this 
project also analyzed the situation after the enactment of the Ordinance by 
Kingdon’s three-stream model. It recognized that, as a big bang system changing, 
the Ordinance has really tackled a number of past problems in the first-hand 
residential property market. However, when having a closer look, it is discovered 
there are a number of freedoms in the Ordinance being perverted by the 
developers to continue their malpractices. Using the same policy making cycle 
model, it is found that the flaws are stemmed from the rush consideration process 
during the tools being formulated. Without thorough discussion during the 
legislative process, the Ordinance is found to be having lots of rooms to improve 
in accordance with the assessment criteria by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge and the 
factors by Freiberg. Yet, unlike the situation prior to the Ordinance, the political 
stream was not strong and the Ordinance as a monitoring mechanism is still 
running smoothly in some aspects. Therefore, the government does not have 
strong dynamic to substitute the Ordinance, but optimize it.   
Inspiring from the relevant mechanism and experience of Taiwan and Singapore, 
the project identified a number of measures which can be taken for Hong Kong's 
reference. Using the criteria as identified by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge as well as 
Freiberg, various enhancement measures in which the Hong Kong Government 
can adopt to optimize the regulatory framework have been proposed.  
This project has tried to integrate various theories on policy making, policy 
dynamic, policy evaluation and governance models to analyze the regulatory 
framework for the sale of first-hand residential properties under different 
127 
circumstances. Through the systematic analysis across various scholars’ theories, 
the project identified an integrated policy-making cycle to examine the 
relationship between considerations, outcome evaluation of tools and situation 
requiring the government to choose policy arrangement. It is believed such an 
analytical framework could assist the government in formulating appropriate, 
effective and timely policies which are beneficial to the society. The government 
is recommended to use the above framework to choose, review and optimize, not 
only the policy tools adopted in monitoring the sale of first-hand residential 
properties, but also other measures in different policy areas. 
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